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Security audit

mro-inquiry-match

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed MRO procurement matching helper that uses a user-provided API key to query an external product service, with no evidence of hidden persistence, exfiltration, or destructive behavior.

Install only if you are comfortable sending procurement inquiry terms, model numbers, specifications, and selected product-detail requests to the MRO API and possibly consuming account credits. Store MRO_API_KEY only in your agent's secret or environment settings, keep MRO_API_BASE_URL at the default unless you fully trust the replacement endpoint, and review generated spreadsheet outputs before relying on matches for purchasing decisions.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (7)

Tainted flow: 'request' from os.environ.get (line 74, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The client lets MRO_API_BASE_URL come directly from an environment variable and then sends the bearer API key in an Authorization header to that URL. If an attacker can influence the environment or wrapper configuration, they can redirect requests to an attacker-controlled host and exfiltrate the credential, making this effectively an SSRF-plus-secret-leak issue. In an agent/skill context, user-controlled execution environments and indirect configuration make this more dangerous because the tool is designed to automatically call remote services with sensitive authentication material.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mro_api_client.py (reported line 85)May include surrounding context.

python
},
    )
    try:
        with urlopen(request, timeout=timeout, context=tls_context()) as response:
            return decode_response(response.read())
    except HTTPError as exc:
        detail = decode_response(exc.read())

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The manifest description is entirely prescriptive in Chinese and describes the skill's behavior as handling inquiries and producing outputs in that mode, with no indication that users may choose another language. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language or locale without user opt-in is a natural-language policy violation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

This line explicitly instructs the agent to translate English descriptions into accurate Chinese search terms, which imposes a specific language choice. The file does not provide a user-facing option to keep the original language or choose another locale, so it conflicts with the language/locale policy.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The entire skill guidance is written as mandatory operational instructions in Chinese, with no indication that users may choose another language or locale. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy violation unless the locale restriction is explicitly justified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The file’s user-facing instructions are entirely in Chinese, and there is no indication that users may choose another language or that the skill is intentionally restricted to a Chinese-speaking audience. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy violation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
77% confidence
Finding

This markdown file documents three ways to send an API key in request headers, which is a privacy- and security-relevant behavior. The document does not include any warning about keeping keys secret, avoiding committing them to code, or preventing accidental disclosure in logs or shared examples.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.