Resume

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 10, 2026 · 8:20 PM UTC
• Version: 1.0.16

Overview

This skill is a coherent CellCog-based resume and cover letter helper, with a supply-chain caution around unpinned setup commands.

Install CellCog only from sources you trust, prefer a pinned version or reviewed release when available, and consider using a virtual environment. Do not provide resume, LinkedIn, or career details unless you are comfortable sending that information to CellCog, and keep CELLCOG_API_KEY protected.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:158

Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 158-161
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk from mutable, unverified third-party dependencies
Risk Level: Medium

The skill recommends installing CellCog packages and skill content from external registries without pinning an exact version or immutable revision and without verifying a checksum or signature.

markdown

**Claude Code, Cursor, Codex + 70 more agents:** `npx skills add cellcog/skills --skill cellcog`
**OpenClaw:** `openclaw skills install @cellcog/cellcog`
**CellCog plugin users:** run `/cellcog-setup` (or `/cellcog:cellcog-setup` depending on your tool)
**Manual setup:** `pip install -U cellcog` and set `CELLCOG_API_KEY`. See the **cellcog** skill for SDK reference.

Technical Analysis

These installation commands resolve mutable third-party content at installation time. No exact package version, immutable source revision, lockfile, checksum, or signature is specified. In particular, pip install -U cellcog explicitly requests an available upgraded release rather than a reviewed version.

The installed package, skill content, and transitive dependencies are not included in this project and therefore were outside the reviewed artifact. If an upstream registry account, repository, release process, or transitive dependency is compromised, following these instructions could introduce attacker-controlled code after this skill has passed review.

This finding does not establish that the current CellCog package is malicious. It identifies an unsafe dependency acquisition process that does not guarantee users receive the same dependency content that was reviewed or tested.

Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises an upstream package publisher, skill repository, registry account, or transitive dependency.
2. The attacker publishes a malicious release under the dependency name referenced by the documented commands.
3. A user follows the i ...[truncated 1061 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Pin every dependency to a reviewed exact version rather than installing the latest available release.
2. Where Git-based skill installation is required, reference an immutable commit hash instead of a mutable branch or tag.
3. Publish expected cryptographic checksums or verified signatures for downloaded artifacts and require validation before installation.
4. Use lockfiles or equivalent dependency manifests that pin all transitive dependencies.
5. Avoid pip install -U in security-sensitive setup instructions; use an exact version such as cellcog==<reviewed-version>.
6. Restrict installation to documented trusted registries and enable package provenance or signature verification where supported.
7. Run installation and execution in a least-privilege virtual environment or sandbox without unnecessary secrets.
8. Review and test each dependency update before changing the pinned version, including inspecting installation hooks and transitive dependency changes.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 95% confidence

Finding

The skill instructs users to run npx skills add cellcog/skills --skill cellcog without pinning a specific package version. This causes execution or retrieval of whatever package/version is current at install time, which creates a supply-chain risk if the upstream package is compromised, a malicious version is published, or a breaking change introduces unsafe behavior. In this context, the risk is somewhat elevated because the command is presented as a setup step users may copy-paste directly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.