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Security audit

Deep Research

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill coherently delegates research to CellCog, with expected considerations around sharing prompts, paid usage, and installing dependencies.

Research prompts and included context are sent to CellCog, so share confidential information only when authorized. Review and preferably pin dependency versions before installation. Check credit costs and the notification destination; OpenClaw completion delivery uses a background component. Request citations explicitly and verify consequential research conclusions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

The workflow sends user research prompts to CellCog without a privacy or third-party data-sharing warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The usage workflow passes the user's task prompt to CellCog through client.create_chat. Although the skill identifies CellCog as its provider, it does not explicitly warn that prompt contents are transmitted to an external service, which is relevant for confidential investment, company, or due-diligence research.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The setup command invokes an unpinned npm CLI through npx skills, allowing the package version executed during installation to change without review. A compromised or malicious release could execute code with the installing user's permissions; however, this is an optional installation path, and the static finding's characterization as an MCP server reference is incorrect.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.