T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:218- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 218–221
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and mutable third-party dependencies
Risk Level: Mediumtext **Claude Code, Cursor, Codex + 70 more agents:** `npx skills add cellcog/skills --skill cellcog` **OpenClaw:** `openclaw skills install @cellcog/cellcog` **CellCog plugin users:** run `/cellcog-setup` (or `/cellcog:cellcog-setup` depending on your tool) **Manual setup:** `pip install -U cellcog` and set `CELLCOG_API_KEY`. See the **cellcog** skill for SDK reference.Technical Analysis
The documented installation commands retrieve third-party components without specifying verified versions, immutable commit hashes, or integrity checksums. In particular,
pip install -U cellcogrequests the newest available package release, while thenpxand OpenClaw installation commands similarly identify mutable upstream package sources.Consequently, the code installed by a future invocation may differ from the content available when this Skill was reviewed. If an upstream repository, package registry account, release pipeline, or transitive dependency is compromised, users following these instructions could install attacker-controlled code. This is a supply-chain weakness; the audited file does not establish that the currently available CellCog package is malicious.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises an upstream package publisher, registry account, source repository, build pipeline, or dependency used by the referenced package.
- The attacker publishes a malicious release under the expected package identifier.
- A user or agent follows one of the unpinned installation instructions in
SKILL.md. - The package manager resolves the mutable identifier to the attacker-controlled release.
- Malicious installation hooks or package code execute when the component is installed or subsequently imported.
- The payload operates with the privileges and ...[truncated 584 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin every dependency to a reviewed, exact version rather than requesting the newest release.
- For repository-based installation, use an immutable commit hash instead of a branch or mutable tag.
- Publish and verify cryptographic hashes or signatures for distributable artifacts.
- Maintain a dependency lockfile that includes resolved transitive dependencies and integrity metadata.
- Remove automatic upgrade behavior such as
pip install -Ufrom routine setup instructions. - Require users to verify the package publisher, source repository, release signature, and expected checksum before installation.
- Install and execute the dependency in a least-privilege environment with restricted filesystem, credential, and network access.
- Audit new package versions before updating the pinned version and document a controlled upgrade process.
