T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
README.md:42- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Execution During Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
README.md, lines 42-44
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned package execution and software supply-chain risk
Risk Level: Mediumbash npx clawhub@latest install snippets-syncTechnical Analysis
The documented installation command instructs
npxto obtain and execute the mutablelatestrelease of the third-partyclawhubpackage. The effective code executed by this command can therefore change after the Skill has been reviewed.No exact package version, lockfile, package integrity hash, or other artifact-verification mechanism is specified. If the package publisher account, package registry, or a future release is compromised, users following the documentation could execute unreviewed attacker-controlled code. The issue is confined to the installation guidance; the audited project itself contains no bundled executable scripts or malicious payloads.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the
clawhubpublisher account, registry distribution channel, or a future package release. - The attacker publishes malicious code as the release resolved by the
latesttag. - A user follows the installation instructions and runs
npx clawhub@latest install snippets-sync. npxdownloads and executes the mutable package version.- The malicious package runs with the privileges and environment available to the installing user.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could allow arbitrary code execution with the installing user's privileges. Depending on that user's permissions and environment, the malicious package could access user-readable files, environment variables, project data, and network resources or modify user-writable files. This finding does not independently provide administrative privileges; its practical scope is limited by the privileges of the user executing the installation command.
- An attacker compromises the
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace
@latestwith an exact, reviewed package version. - Publish and verify the expected package provenance and registry source.
- Use a lockfile or an equivalent immutable dependency-resolution mechanism where supported.
- Verify the downloaded package using a trusted integrity hash or signature before execution.
- Review new package versions before updating the pinned installation command.
- Consider separating package download from execution so users can inspect and verify the artifact before running it.
- Replace
