T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:194- Finding
Mutable Remote Installer Is Executed Directly Through a Shell
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill has a coherent A2A setup purpose, but its install, credential, and network instructions are too broad and risky for automatic installation.
Install only after reviewing and pinning the plugin source and dependencies, replacing curl-to-shell installation with a safer package-manager flow, binding the gateway to a trusted interface or encrypted overlay, and moving peer tokens out of TOOLS.md into a secret store. Require explicit user confirmation before sending content to a peer and avoid constructing shell commands with raw message text.
SKILL.md:194Mutable Remote Installer Is Executed Directly Through a Shell
SKILL.md:22Plugin and npm Dependencies Are Installed from Unpinned Mutable Sources
references/tools-md-template.md:18User-Controlled Message Text Is Interpolated into a Shell Command
references/tools-md-template.md:9Reusable Bearer Tokens Are Stored in Plaintext Agent Instructions
SKILL.md:73A2A Gateway Is Bound to All Interfaces and Documented with Plaintext HTTP
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
openclaw gateway restart
# Verify Agent Card
curl -s http://localhost:18800/.well-known/agent-card.json | python3 -m json.tool
# Verify peer connectivity
curl -s http://<PEER_IP>:18800/.well-known/agent-card.json | python3 -m json.tool
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
curl -s http://localhost:18800/.well-known/agent-card.json | python3 -m json.tool
curl -s http://<PEER_IP>:18800/.well-known/agent-card.json | python3 -m json.tool
## Step 9: Configure TOOLS.md
The skill instructs users to fetch and immediately execute a remote script via 'curl ... | sh', which creates a direct remote code execution path if the source, transport, DNS, or hosting account is compromised. Because this installation path is presented as normal setup, users may run it without inspection, and in this context it is followed by privileged networking steps, increasing risk.
When servers are on different networks, use Tailscale:
curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh
sudo tailscale up
# Authenticate via the printed URL (use same account on all servers)
tailscale ip -4 # Get the 100.x.x.x IP
The explicit '| sh' shell-chaining turns downloaded network content into immediately executed commands, removing any review boundary and magnifying supply-chain and man-in-the-middle risks. In a setup skill, this is especially dangerous because users are likely to copy-paste it during privileged system configuration.
When servers are on different networks, use Tailscale:
curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh
sudo tailscale up
# Authenticate via the printed URL (use same account on all servers)
tailscale ip -4 # Get the 100.x.x.x IP
The skill generates a bearer token and explicitly instructs the user to save and share it with peers, but it does not warn that this token is a secret or provide guidance for secure storage, rotation, or transmission. In an A2A setup, compromise of this token would allow unauthorized peers to send authenticated requests to the gateway.
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh
sudo tailscale up
# Authenticate via the printed URL (use same account on all servers)
tailscale ip -4 # Get the 100.x.x.x IP
The template tells operators to place peer authentication tokens directly into TOOLS.md and inline command examples that are intended to be visible to the agent. That unnecessarily exposes bearer credentials to prompts, logs, downstream tools, and anyone with access to the workspace, enabling unauthorized cross-server messaging or impersonation if the token is leaked.
The phrase "or similar" broadens the set of natural-language triggers that authorize networked peer messaging, making it easier for ambiguous, indirect, or adversarial prompts to cause unintended cross-server communication. In an agent instruction file, loose trigger wording weakens intent boundaries and increases prompt-injection and accidental-exfiltration risk.
The template instructs the agent to send arbitrary message content to another server using an authenticated command, but provides no warning, consent check, or data-classification guardrail. This makes sensitive user or system data more likely to be transmitted off-host without notice, and the included token handling amplifies the impact by authorizing the outbound request automatically.