MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'uvx install'.
- Category
- MCP Rug Pull
- Confidence
- 65% confidence
- Finding
uvx/uv tool run commands without ==version create a rug-pull risk.
- Content
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
ClawScan marks this skill suspicious because it references the mcp-stockpile package and a Docker image without fixed versions, so what gets installed could change; no clear malicious behavior was reported.
Review the setup instructions before installing. Prefer a reviewed, fixed version of the MCP package and a fixed Docker image digest, and consider what API credentials and local access the server would receive. The scan was partial: it inspected the listed Markdown component but could not resolve two local references, so the evidence is incomplete.
uvx/uv tool run commands without ==version create a rug-pull risk.
uvx/uv tool run commands without ==version create a rug-pull risk.
Although the matched fragment is incomplete, its installation entry specifies package: mcp-stockpile without an exact version. A compromised or malicious package release could execute with the agent process's permissions and access its API key; the skill's own version field does not pin this dependency, and confirmation requirements do not constrain malicious server code.
The Claude Code setup registers uvx mcp-stockpile without an exact package version, leaving execution dependent on whichever release uvx resolves. A compromised release could run with local user permissions and obtain configured credentials, enabling unauthorized merchant operations despite the documented confirmation policy.
The Cursor server command executes an unpinned mcp-stockpile package. If package distribution or a subsequent release is compromised, the server could access credentials and local resources available to its process; its inventory and fulfillment role increases the potential business impact.
Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.
The direct execution example runs mcp-stockpile without a version constraint, allowing package resolution to change without a corresponding change to this skill. A malicious resolved release could execute local code and steal the Stockpile API key, potentially compromising connected stores.
Although the match stops at command flags, the full command uses casualbrooks/mcp-stockpile without a tag or digest, implicitly selecting the mutable latest tag. A substituted image would receive STOCKPILE_API_KEY directly and could misuse merchant access; container isolation does not protect credentials intentionally passed into the container.