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Security audit

text-to-published-podcast-rss-test

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward guide for publishing text as podcast audio, but users should understand the text is sent to cast0.ai and auto-published to a public RSS feed.

Install only if you intend to publish supplied text as podcast audio. Treat any episode text as public, confirm before creating an episode, and store the CAST0_API_KEY securely rather than committing it to source control.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (8)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

Each API key is tied to one podcast. Once you have the key, save it:

bash
echo "CAST0_API_KEY=pk_xxxxx" >> .env

Create an Episode

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill prominently markets one-call episode creation but does not warn at the point of use that created content is automatically published to a public RSS feed. This can cause users or downstream agents to send sensitive, draft, or internal text to a publicly accessible distribution channel without informed consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

md
**Base URL:** `https://api.cast0.ai`
**Auth:** `Authorization: Bearer pk_xxxxx`
**Docs:** `https://api.cast0.ai/docs`

## Setup

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 47)May include surrounding context.

md
**Base URL:** `https://api.cast0.ai`
**Auth:** `Authorization: Bearer pk_xxxxx`
**Docs:** `https://api.cast0.ai/docs`

## Setup

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

md
**Base URL:** `https://api.cast0.ai`
**Auth:** `Authorization: Bearer pk_xxxxx`
**Docs:** `https://api.cast0.ai/docs`

## Setup

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The create-episode example demonstrates outbound transmission of user content to a remote service. Because this skill auto-publishes generated episodes to a public RSS feed, the transmission is more dangerous than ordinary cloud processing and can lead to unintended public disclosure.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

Create an Episode

bash
curl -X POST https://api.cast0.ai/api/episodes \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer pk_xxxxx" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"title": "Daily Standup", "text": "Here is what happened today..."}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The create-episode example demonstrates outbound transmission of user content to a remote service. Because this skill auto-publishes generated episodes to a public RSS feed, the transmission is more dangerous than ordinary cloud processing and can lead to unintended public disclosure.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

Create an Episode

bash
curl -X POST https://api.cast0.ai/api/episodes \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer pk_xxxxx" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"title": "Daily Standup", "text": "Here is what happened today..."}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill documents that each podcast has a public no-auth RSS feed, which means generated content is accessible to anyone with the feed token and consumable by podcast apps. In context, this public exposure materially raises the impact of accidental submission of confidential or sensitive text.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 65)May include surrounding context.

Every podcast has a public feed URL (no auth):

text
https://api.cast0.ai/rss/FEED_TOKEN

Subscribe in any podcast app. New episodes appear automatically after generation.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.