T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:61- Finding
Mutable and Unaudited Third-Party Skill Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 61-66
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain exposure through mutable and unaudited remote dependencies
Risk Level: MediumComplete Code Snippet:
markdown ### Installation Also installs: ai-sentinel (prompt injection firewall), skill-guard (malware scanner) ```bash npx clawhub@latest install ai-sentinel npx clawhub@latest install skill-guardtext ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions invoke the mutable `clawhub@latest` npm package and use it to install two remotely resolved Skills, `ai-sentinel` and `skill-guard`. The project does not pin exact versions, provide integrity hashes, vendor the dependencies, or include their source for review. Consequently, the software executed during installation may differ from what existed when this project was audited. An npm registry compromise, package-account compromise, package-name takeover, or malicious future release could cause the invoking user to execute attacker-controlled installer behavior. The two installed Skills also create a transitive trust boundary because their implementation and effective instructions are not present in the audited project. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the publishing channel or maintainer account for `clawhub`, `ai-sentinel`, or `skill-guard`, or publishes a malicious future release through another applicable supply-chain attack. 2. The attacker introduces malicious installer code or Skill content into the remotely resolved release. 3. A user asks the agent to set up the safety rails and follows the documented installation instructions. 4. `npx clawhub@latest` retrieves and runs the current mutable release rather than an audited, fixed artifact. 5. The installer retrieves the unaudited third-party Skills. 6. Malicious code or instructions execute with the permissions available to the invoking user or agent. ### Impact Assessment Suc ...[truncated 656 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin
clawhuband each installed Skill to exact, reviewed versions rather than using@latestor otherwise mutable identifiers. - Verify downloaded artifacts with cryptographic integrity hashes or authenticated signatures.
- Vendor the dependency sources into the reviewed package where practical, or provide immutable source references and audit them separately.
- Document verified publishers, canonical repositories, and expected package fingerprints.
- Require explicit user approval immediately before downloading or executing each external component.
- Run installation in a sandbox with minimal filesystem, credential, network, and command-execution permissions.
- Establish dependency monitoring and repeat the security review whenever a pinned dependency is upgraded.
- Pin
