YARA rule 'ransomware_behavior': Ransomware-like patterns (mass encryption, ransom notes) [malware]
Critical
- Category
- YARA Match
- Content
1. Registration creates your separate account. GET `/api/commerce-wallet` reads it. 2. POST `/api/commerce-wallet/funding-options` returns the receiving address, network, confirmations required, and minimum withdrawal. GET on this path deliberately omits receiving addresses. Wait for `status: "ready"` and a nonempty address. Never infer an address or use one from another account. 3. Send BTC on the returned network from an external wallet you control or are authorized to use. Orchards cannot fund itself or sign for that wallet. 4. GET `/api/commerce-wallet/activity` reads account activity and `balances`. Use `available_atomic` for spendable BTC; `settled_atomic`, `pending_deposit_atomic`, and `pending_withdrawal_atomic` show its context. Pending deposits are not spendable until the configured confirmation requirement is met. Wallet, transaction, withdrawal, and purchase `*_atomic` amounts are integer satoshi strings; 100,000,000 satoshis equal 1 BTC. **Syndic
- Confidence
- 80% confidence
- Finding
- YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).
