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Security audit

CC3PO Music Generation

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a documentation-only AI music generation skill; its third-party API examples are expected for the purpose, but users should be careful with prompts, lyrics, audio files, and API keys.

Install only if you are comfortable using third-party music generation services. Avoid entering confidential lyrics, unreleased business material, personal data, private reference audio, internal webhook URLs, or long-lived API keys into these examples unless you have reviewed the provider's terms, privacy practices, billing model, and token handling.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (23)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The skill directs the agent to use external music-generation providers and provider-specific files, but it does not warn users that prompts, lyrics, or uploaded reference material may be sent to third-party services. This can lead to unintended disclosure of sensitive or proprietary creative content, especially in commercial or private projects where users may assume local-only handling.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The examples instruct users to send prompts and an API bearer token to a third-party service but do not disclose that prompts, tags, and credentials are transmitted off-platform. In a skill/documentation context this is a real transparency and privacy issue, though it is not by itself an exploit or malicious behavior.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The Replicate API example transmits prompt content to an external third-party service, but the skill does not clearly disclose that data leaves the local environment. In a music-generation context, prompts may contain proprietary creative ideas, customer data, or other sensitive project information, so users could unknowingly expose private content.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The examples instruct users to install and use Replicate with an API token and later show webhook configuration, but they do not warn that prompts, uploaded audio, and result metadata are sent to a third-party service. In this skill context, users may submit proprietary music prompts or source audio, so the omission can lead to unintended data disclosure and unsafe production integration.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The document recommends unofficial third-party APIs for Suno without warning that user prompts, custom lyrics, and API credentials are transmitted to external services outside the official provider. In a music-generation skill, prompts and lyrics may contain proprietary creative material or sensitive data, so omission of privacy, trust, and data-handling warnings creates a real security and privacy risk.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```python
import requests

response = requests.post(
    "https://api.mubert.com/v2/generate",
    headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}"},
    json={
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
This duplicate finding points to the same authenticated POST request to Mubert's generate endpoint. The security concern is not that the code is inherently malicious, but that the documentation normalizes sending prompts and secrets to an external service without warning or safeguards.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```python
# Using Mubert's text-to-music
response = requests.post(
    "https://api.mubert.com/v2/ttm",
    headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}"},
    json={
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
This duplicate finding refers to the same text-to-music POST call. It remains a real issue in documentation because it encourages remote transmission of prompt content and credentials without transparency about privacy and data handling.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## Tag-Based Generation

```python
response = requests.post(
    "https://api.mubert.com/v2/generate",
    json={
        "tags": ["electronic", "upbeat", "happy"],
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding
This duplicate finding again flags the tag-based POST request to Mubert. In context, the call is legitimate for music generation, but users should still be warned that request contents are transmitted externally and may be logged by the provider.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```python
# Initialize stream
stream = requests.post(
    "https://api.mubert.com/v2/stream/start",
    json={"tags": ["lo-fi", "chill"]}
)
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding
This duplicate finding points to the same stream-start POST request. The risk is low but real because it establishes an external connection and returns a provider-controlled stream URL without any warning or handling guidance.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```python
import requests

response = requests.post(
    "https://api.mubert.com/v2/generate",
    headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}"},
    json={
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
This duplicate finding points to the same authenticated POST request to Mubert's generate endpoint. The security concern is not that the code is inherently malicious, but that the documentation normalizes sending prompts and secrets to an external service without warning or safeguards.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```python
# Using Mubert's text-to-music
response = requests.post(
    "https://api.mubert.com/v2/ttm",
    headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}"},
    json={
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
This duplicate finding refers to the same text-to-music POST call. It remains a real issue in documentation because it encourages remote transmission of prompt content and credentials without transparency about privacy and data handling.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## Tag-Based Generation

```python
response = requests.post(
    "https://api.mubert.com/v2/generate",
    json={
        "tags": ["electronic", "upbeat", "happy"],
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding
This duplicate finding again flags the tag-based POST request to Mubert. In context, the call is legitimate for music generation, but users should still be warned that request contents are transmitted externally and may be logged by the provider.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```python
# Initialize stream
stream = requests.post(
    "https://api.mubert.com/v2/stream/start",
    json={"tags": ["lo-fi", "chill"]}
)
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding
This duplicate finding points to the same stream-start POST request. The risk is low but real because it establishes an external connection and returns a provider-controlled stream URL without any warning or handling guidance.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
import requests

response = requests.post(
    "https://api.mubert.com/v2/generate",
    headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}"},
    json={
        "prompt": "energetic workout music",
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
The hardcoded remote API endpoint indicates explicit third-party transmission as part of the example. In this skill's context that is expected behavior, so the issue is not suspicious intent but missing disclosure and safe-use guidance around external calls and credential use.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```python
# Using Mubert's text-to-music
response = requests.post(
    "https://api.mubert.com/v2/ttm",
    headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}"},
    json={
        "prompt": "relaxing ambient music for meditation",
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
This endpoint reference supports a live call to Mubert's text-to-music API, meaning prompt data leaves the local system. The context reduces suspicion because the skill is explicitly about cloud music generation, but users still need transparency about external processing.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```python
response = requests.post(
    "https://api.mubert.com/v2/generate",
    json={
        "tags": ["electronic", "upbeat", "happy"],
        "bpm": 120,
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
This endpoint reference shows that the tag-based generation example contacts Mubert externally. The impact is low because only generation parameters are shown, but it is still a real data-transmission concern in the absence of warning text.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```python
# Initialize stream
stream = requests.post(
    "https://api.mubert.com/v2/stream/start",
    json={"tags": ["lo-fi", "chill"]}
)
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
This endpoint reference indicates use of Mubert's remote streaming API and therefore an outbound connection to provider infrastructure. The main danger is unannounced external transmission and potential provider visibility into usage patterns, not direct system compromise.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```python
import requests

response = requests.post(
    "https://api.sunoapi.org/v1/generate",
    headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}"},
    json={
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding
This finding is a duplicate view of the same outbound request to SunoAPI.org, highlighting both the network call and embedded bearer-token use. It is security-relevant because it documents sending user input and credentials to an unofficial external endpoint without contextual warnings.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**PiAPI (suno-v5):**
```python
response = requests.post(
    "https://api.piapi.ai/api/v1/suno/generate",
    headers={"X-API-Key": API_KEY},
    json={
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding
This is a duplicate detection of the PiAPI request, again emphasizing external transmission and credential use. The main risk is not the existence of an HTTP request itself, but that the skill normalizes sending user material to an unofficial provider without privacy/security guidance.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```python
import requests

response = requests.post(
    "https://api.sunoapi.org/v1/generate",
    headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}"},
    json={
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding
This finding is a duplicate view of the same outbound request to SunoAPI.org, highlighting both the network call and embedded bearer-token use. It is security-relevant because it documents sending user input and credentials to an unofficial external endpoint without contextual warnings.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**PiAPI (suno-v5):**
```python
response = requests.post(
    "https://api.piapi.ai/api/v1/suno/generate",
    headers={"X-API-Key": API_KEY},
    json={
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding
This is a duplicate detection of the PiAPI request, again emphasizing external transmission and credential use. The main risk is not the existence of an HTTP request itself, but that the skill normalizes sending user material to an unofficial provider without privacy/security guidance.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
import requests

response = requests.post(
    "https://api.sunoapi.org/v1/generate",
    headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}"},
    json={
        "prompt": "upbeat pop song about summer",
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding
The hardcoded third-party endpoint identifies a concrete external destination for submitted prompts and lyrics, confirming data leaves the local environment. In a skill intended for broad use, naming the unofficial host without caution can encourage unsafe sharing of sensitive creative or business material.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**PiAPI (suno-v5):**
```python
response = requests.post(
    "https://api.piapi.ai/api/v1/suno/generate",
    headers={"X-API-Key": API_KEY},
    json={
        "prompt": "epic orchestral trailer music",
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding
This endpoint reference shows another external third-party destination for user generation requests. While not malicious by itself, it contributes to a real exposure path because the skill provides no warning about data handling, retention, or trust boundaries for the unofficial provider.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.