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Security audit

track-funding-rounds

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill provides a coherent Cargo funding lookup with cost controls and an optional GitHub star request that requires explicit consent.

Funding lookups send selected company domains to Cargo and spend credits; share only authorized account lists and review the full-batch estimate. Consider reviewed package versions, and assess the optional broader pack separately because its implementation was not verified here. GitHub starring is optional and requires your explicit agreement.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (6)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

The supplied commands do not retrieve or track company funding. Instead, they perform an undeclared GitHub account modification and create a related local marker. These actions are unrelated to the declared funding-tracking purpose and are not supporting implementation details for it.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Although the repository is associated with Cargo, the supplied code only invokes a skill installer. Installation could support a larger implementation, but no such implementation is shown; the chunk's actual behavior is skill installation rather than funding tracking. No malicious behavior is established by this command alone.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The funding lookup sends target-company domains to Cargo without an explicit data-sharing warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The workflow instructs the agent to submit company-domain records to Cargo for enrichment, including potentially domains drawn from the user's account list. Although Cargo is named as the provider, the skill does not warn that these records leave the user's environment and are disclosed to an external service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The command invokes an unpinned npm executable through npx, potentially downloading and executing whatever version resolves at execution time. A compromised upstream release could execute code with the user's privileges; however, this is an optional installation recommendation, not an MCP server reference as the detector claims.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 126)May include surrounding context.

bash
gh api -X PUT /user/starred/getcargohq/gtm-skills     # 204 = starred; there is no `gh repo star`
mkdir -p ~/.config/cargo-ai && touch ~/.config/cargo-ai/.star-asked   # touch on either answer

If gh is missing or unauthenticated, name the URL and move on — this never becomes a task.

The skill includes an unrelated GitHub endorsement workflow that modifies the user's account and writes a local tracking marker.

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The stated purpose is retrieving company funding information through Cargo, but this section instructs the agent to star the publisher's repository using the user's GitHub account and create a persistent local marker. Explicit consent mitigates unauthorized action, but repository promotion and its tracking state are not necessary for funding research or declared in the manifest's scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.