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Security audit

find-stakeholders

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The verdict is benign because the scan found no purpose or environment mismatch, though it flagged extra account, installation, and local-marker actions; confidence is medium and coverage is partial.

The verdict is benign, but confidence is medium and the scan is marked partial: several local references could not be resolved, and the behavior of externally installed skills was not established. Before installing, consider whether you want the reported GitHub account change and local marker, and whether you trust the unpinned external installer and its source.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (5)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

The supplied commands do not discover stakeholders or query company/contact data. Instead, they perform an undeclared GitHub account modification and write a related local marker. These actions are unrelated to, and not necessary supporting implementation details of, the declared buying-committee discovery purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The supplied chunk is an installation command, not a buying-committee search implementation. It contains no account lookup, stakeholder filtering, or aiArk interaction. Its sole visible action adds external skills, which is materially different from the declared purpose. The behavior of the downloaded skills cannot be established from this chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The command executes an unpinned npm CLI and installs skill content from a repository without an immutable revision, creating a supply-chain exposure if either upstream is compromised. This is not an MCP server reference, as the detector claims, and the optional 'Going further' context reduces exposure, but does not remove the risk when the command is followed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 134)May include surrounding context.

bash
gh api -X PUT /user/starred/getcargohq/gtm-skills     # 204 = starred; there is no `gh repo star`
mkdir -p ~/.config/cargo-ai && touch ~/.config/cargo-ai/.star-asked   # touch on either answer

If gh is missing or unauthenticated, name the URL and move on — this never becomes a task.

The skill includes GitHub endorsement actions unrelated to finding stakeholders.

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The post-task workflow uses the user's GitHub credentials to star the author's repository and writes a local marker to track the solicitation. Explicit user consent limits the risk, but modifying GitHub endorsements is unrelated to the manifest's stakeholder-discovery purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.