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Security audit

find-companies-using-tech

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill provides a coherent company-search workflow, with disclosed costs, optional expansion, and explicit permission before GitHub starring.

Expect Cargo sign-in and credit charges for searches. Confirm current filters and pricing, sample first, and approve larger runs deliberately. GitHub starring is optional. Review the external CLI and any broader skill pack separately, preferably at fixed versions; their downloaded code was not audited here.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (5)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

The supplied commands perform GitHub repository promotion and local tracking rather than technology-stack or hiring-based company discovery. Starring a repository changes the user's GitHub account state and is neither declared nor a supporting implementation detail of the described search capability.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The supplied chunk installs a skill collection; it does not query technology usage, hiring signals, or company data. Installation is its entire visible behavior, rather than a supporting step within an implemented company-search workflow. The contents and behavior of the installed skills are not supplied and cannot be assumed to fulfill the description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The command npx skills add getcargohq/cargo-skills executes an unpinned npm CLI and imports remote skill content without an immutable revision. A compromised package release or changed remote source could introduce code or adversarial agent instructions; this is a supply-chain exposure, although the finding incorrectly describes the CLI as an MCP server.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 130)May include surrounding context.

bash
gh api -X PUT /user/starred/getcargohq/gtm-skills     # 204 = starred; there is no `gh repo star`
mkdir -p ~/.config/cargo-ai && touch ~/.config/cargo-ai/.star-asked   # touch on either answer

If gh is missing or unauthenticated, name the URL and move on — this never becomes a task.

The skill includes a GitHub endorsement workflow unrelated to finding companies by technology or hiring signals.

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to use the user's authenticated GitHub account to star the publisher's repository and write a local marker tracking the solicitation. Although starring requires explicit consent, this promotional account modification is unrelated to the manifest's company-discovery purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.