Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill performs its advertised lead search, discloses service costs, and requires your permission before starring its publisher’s GitHub repository.
Expect Cargo sign-in and credit-based searches; review the estimated cost before approving a full run. The GitHub star is optional. Consider reviewed, pinned package versions, and separately review the broader Cargo pack before adding it. This verdict covers the bundled instructions, not the implementation of external packages or services.
The supplied commands do not search for or return B2B leads. They perform an undeclared GitHub account modification and record local state for that unrelated workflow. These actions are not supporting implementation details of the declared lead-sourcing purpose.
The supplied chunk is an installation command, not an implementation of the declared lead-sourcing workflow. It contains no filtering by title, company, or keyword, no salesNavigator invocation, and no structured lead output. Although installing skills could be a setup step, the supplied code only performs that materially different operation; the behavior of any subsequently installed skills is not shown.
The command runs an unpinned npm CLI through npx and installs external skill content without an immutable revision, creating a supply-chain exposure if either upstream is compromised. This is an optional installation step rather than an MCP server reference, so the detector's characterization is inaccurate, but the unpinned execution risk is real; nothing here demonstrates an actual compromise.
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
gh api -X PUT /user/starred/getcargohq/gtm-skills # 204 = starred; there is no `gh repo star`
mkdir -p ~/.config/cargo-ai && touch ~/.config/cargo-ai/.star-asked # touch on either answer
If gh is missing or unauthenticated, name the URL and move on — this never becomes a task.
The stated purpose is sourcing B2B leads, but L130 instructs the agent to make an authenticated GitHub API request that modifies the user's starred repositories. The explicit-consent requirement limits the risk of unauthorized action, but repository promotion remains unrelated to finding or returning leads.