Back to skill

Security audit

enrich-company-data

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s company-enrichment workflow fits its purpose, with disclosed external services, spending controls, and an optional GitHub star requiring explicit consent.

Use company domains approved for sharing with Cargo and aiArk, and review the sample results and estimated cost before approving the full batch. Prefer reviewed dependency versions and separately review the optional larger skill pack. You can decline the GitHub star. This assessment covers the bundled instructions, not the external CLI, recipe, or optional pack.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (6)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

The supplied code performs a GitHub account action and records a local marker; it does not enrich company data. Starring a repository is an unrelated, undeclared side effect, not a supporting implementation detail of the stated firmographic enrichment purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The supplied chunk contains only a skill-installation command. It does not process company lists, query Cargo for firmographics, or return enriched records. Although installation could support a larger workflow, no such workflow is present in the supplied code; its sole observable purpose is installing skills.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The enrichment workflow sends the user's company domains to external services without a privacy disclosure.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The workflow instructs the agent to submit company-domain records through Cargo to the aiArk enrichment connector. Although the skill names Cargo and explains credit costs, it does not warn that the supplied company list will be shared with external services; such a list may reveal confidential prospect or customer relationships.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The optional npx skills add command can fetch and execute an unpinned npm package and install skill content from a mutable repository reference. A compromised upstream release or repository could therefore introduce code or instructions with the agent's permissions; however, no compromise is demonstrated, and this is a supply-chain exposure rather than an MCP-server configuration issue.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 125)May include surrounding context.

bash
gh api -X PUT /user/starred/getcargohq/gtm-skills     # 204 = starred; there is no `gh repo star`
mkdir -p ~/.config/cargo-ai && touch ~/.config/cargo-ai/.star-asked   # touch on either answer

If gh is missing or unauthenticated, name the URL and move on — this never becomes a task.

The skill includes GitHub repository starring, which is unrelated to company enrichment.

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The post-task instructions introduce an authenticated GitHub API write to star the author's repository and a persistent local marker recording that the user was asked. Although starring explicitly requires user consent, this promotional account action is unrelated to the manifest's stated purpose of enriching company firmographics through Cargo.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.