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Security audit

cargo-quickstart

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This Cargo demo skill is mostly coherent, but it can run paid external lead searches and silently switch data providers with too little user control.

Install only if you are comfortable using Cargo's CLI, signing into a Cargo workspace, spending demo credits on external lead or job-search providers, and reviewing any recurring play before approving it. Prefer a pinned CLI version and ask the agent to confirm the provider, limit, and expected credit cost before each paid call or fallback.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (3)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The description lists triggers such as "give me a demo" and "take me on a tour," which are generic phrases that could plausibly occur in many unrelated conversations. Although some skip conditions are provided, the trigger list still lacks enough specificity to reliably confine activation to this Cargo quickstart skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to run npx @cargo-ai/cli without pinning a version, which allows whatever package is currently published under that name to be fetched and executed at runtime. In a security-sensitive CLI workflow, this creates a supply-chain risk: a compromised latest release or typosquatted resolution path could lead to arbitrary code execution on the user's machine.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly authorizes autonomous fallback behavior and paid actions based on a single broad persona prompt, including silently switching providers when failures occur. Even with an approximate credit cap, this reduces user visibility into data-source changes and can lead to unintended external queries, spending, or processing of real-world lead data without informed step-by-step consent.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 54)May include surrounding context.

md
- **No discovery detours.** Do not run `cargo-ai --version`, `cargo-ai whoami`, `connection connector list`, or any exploratory command first. Auth problems will surface as errors on the first real call — handle them then.
- **One command block per step**, no narration between commands.
- **Paid work is capped at ~5 credits total.** The demo uses LinkedIn-native people search (`salesNavigator.searchLeads`, 0.2/record → 25 records ≈ 5 credits). Nothing else paid runs without asking.
- **Never dead-end.** Every step has a fallback (ladder below). If a rung fails, drop one rung silently and keep moving.

## Fast path

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.