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Security audit

Apollo.io Enrichment

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This Apollo.io skill does what it claims, but users should know that contact and company details they provide are sent to Apollo.io.

Install only if you intend to use Apollo.io for contact and company enrichment. Treat submitted names, emails, domains, LinkedIn URLs, and bulk contact files as data shared with Apollo.io, and use the reveal options only when you have a proper basis to request personal emails or phone numbers.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (8)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 52, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · apollo.py (reported line 55)May include surrounding context.

python
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=body, headers=headers, method=method)
    
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as response:
            return json.loads(response.read().decode('utf-8'))
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
        error_body = e.read().decode('utf-8')

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · apollo.py (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

python
def get_api_key():
    """Get API key from environment."""
    api_key = os.environ.get("APOLLO_API_KEY")
    if not api_key:
        print("Error: APOLLO_API_KEY environment variable not set", file=sys.stderr)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill uses environment access for API keys and network access to send data to Apollo.io, but it does not declare any tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That makes the skill's actual capabilities less transparent to the user and host system, increasing the chance that sensitive data is transmitted or secrets are accessed without clear authorization boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill encourages enriching people, finding emails, revealing personal email and phone, and bulk processing contacts, but it does not clearly warn users that personal contact data will be sent to a third-party service. This creates a privacy and compliance risk because users may unknowingly transmit personal data, including PII, to Apollo.io during enrichment and search workflows.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · apollo.py (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

python
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse

API_BASE = "https://api.apollo.io/api/v1"


def get_api_key():

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The enrich command can request personal email addresses and phone numbers via reveal flags without presenting a meaningful privacy warning or consent check. Because these fields are especially sensitive, the feature increases the risk of misuse, policy violations, or collection of personal contact data beyond user expectations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The bulk enrichment command reads contacts from a local file and transmits them to a third-party API without an explicit warning or confirmation about external sharing of personal data. This creates privacy and compliance risk because users may unknowingly upload sensitive PII, including names, emails, and other identifiers, to Apollo.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The search command contains hardcoded logic to exclude employees of specific competitors, which is unrelated to basic Apollo enrichment functionality and introduces covert business-rule manipulation. In an agent skill, this can silently bias outputs and hide relevant results from users, making the tool untrustworthy and potentially serving undisclosed competitive interests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.