T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Error
- Location
SKILL.md:25- Finding
Shell Command Injection Through Unsafely Interpolated Content
- Content
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post "" ``` `references/cron-config.md:28`: ```text Primary: exec → xurl --app post "" ``` `references/cron-config.md:55`: ```text 1. Search each keyword: xurl --app search "" -n 5 ``` `references/engagement-playbook.md:51-53`: ```text 1. `xurl like ` 2. Write reply (personalised, quality-checked) 3. `xurl reply ""` → fallback to browser if fails ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill constructs shell-style commands by inserting values such as ``, ``, ``, ``, and `` directly into command strings. Several of these values are generated from brand configuration, model output, user input, or content retrieved from X/Twitter. Wrapping a value in double quotes does not make it safe for shell execution. If the underlying `exec` implementation invokes a command shell, characters such as double quotes, command substitutions, backticks, variable expansions, redirection operators, and command separators may still alter the intended command. For example, generated text containing a closing quote followed by shell syntax could terminate the expected argument and introduce another command. The risk is particularly relevant because reply and posting content may be influenced by external social-media posts. Quality scoring and personalization requirements do not constitute syntactic validation or shell escaping. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker supplies malicious brand configuration, asks the operator to use crafted tweet text, or publishes an X/Twitter post designed to influence a generat ...[truncated 1622 chars]- Remediation
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