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Security audit

translator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent translation helper with broad but expected translation triggers and no code, dependencies, persistence, credential access, or hidden execution behavior.

Review outputs carefully for legal, medical, financial, or publication-critical translations, especially because this is not a certified human translator. The broad triggers may activate for ordinary translation requests, but the inspected package does not show hidden execution, credential handling, persistence, or data mutation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (9)

Anti-Refusal Statement

High
Category
Anti-Refusal
Content
- **Fix**: Identify all placeholders, tags, and markup before translating; preserve them exactly; only translate the natural-language text surrounding them

### 16. Ignoring String Length Constraints
- **Problem**: Producing translations that are too long for UI elements (buttons, tooltips, menu items) without warning
- **Example**: EN button "Submit" (6 chars) --> DE "Einreichen" (10 chars) or FR "Soumettre" (9 chars) — may overflow the button
- **Fix**: Check expansion/contraction rates from knowledge/domain.md; flag translations that exceed typical length budgets; offer abbreviated alternatives
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
"id": "bench-med-04",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "description": "Translate a technical document with placeholders and code from English to Korean",
      "input": "Translate this API documentation excerpt into Korean. Preserve all code examples, variable names, and placeholders exactly as they appear. Translate only the natural-language descriptions.\n\n\"## Authentication\n\nAll API requests require a valid access token. Include the token in the `Authorization` header:\n\n```\nAuthorization: Bearer {access_token}\n```\n\n### Getting a Token\n\nSend a POST request to `/api/v2/auth/token` with your credentials:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"client_id\": \"your_client_id\",\n  \"client_secret\": \"your_client_secret\",\n  \"grant_type\": \"client_credentials\"\n}\n```\n\n**Response:** Returns a JSON object containing `access_token` (string), `expires_in` (integer, seconds), and `token_type` (always `\"Bearer\"`).\n\n**Note:** Tokens expire after 3600 seconds (1 hour). Implement token refresh logic to avoid service interruptions.\"",
      "rubric": [
        {
          "criterion": "Placeholder Preservation",
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding
The document presents language-pair guidance beginning with English-to-Chinese register signals using prescriptive language, which can be read as a default language/locale preference rather than an optional example set. Under the policy, forcing a specific language or locale without explicit user choice can be a natural-language policy violation.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The trigger set is broad and includes common natural-language phrases such as 'translate', 'say this in', and 'how do you say', which are likely to appear in ordinary conversation. This increases the chance of unintended or overly eager skill activation, potentially causing the agent to switch behavior unexpectedly and process user content under the skill's instructions when the user did not intend that mode.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
This JSON manifest contains many generic task descriptions and inputs such as 'Translate this...' across multiple languages, but it does not define any activation boundaries, explicit trigger lists, or negative examples. In a manifest-like file, such broad phrases overlap with common user requests and could cause unintended invocation if used as skill triggers or routing descriptions.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
Multiple tasks explicitly require outputs in Spanish, French, German, Simplified Chinese, Japanese, Arabic, Korean, English, and Brazilian Portuguese. Because the file hard-codes language/locale requirements as instructions rather than presenting them as user-selectable options or documenting a justified regional scope, it creates a natural-language locale policy concern.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The task explicitly instructs translation into Simplified Chinese, which imposes a specific language/locale requirement. For this file type, natural-language policy issues apply, and there is no indication that the language choice is user-selected or that the constraint is justified as a region-specific requirement.

Overly Broad Trigger

Low
Category
Trigger Abuse
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Overly Broad Trigger: '翻译' is too short and may match unintended inputs

Scope Creep

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
"id": "bench-med-01",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "description": "Translate a legal clause from English to Chinese with formal equivalence",
      "input": "Translate this legal clause into Simplified Chinese. This is from a commercial contract and must preserve precise legal meaning. Use formal equivalence approach.\n\n\"Limitation of Liability. In no event shall either party be liable to the other for any indirect, incidental, special, consequential, or punitive damages, including but not limited to loss of profits, data, or business opportunities, arising out of or related to this Agreement, regardless of the theory of liability (contract, tort, strict liability, or otherwise), even if such party has been advised of the possibility of such damages. Each party's total cumulative liability under this Agreement shall not exceed the fees paid by Client to Provider during the twelve (12) month period immediately preceding the event giving rise to such liability.\"",
      "rubric": [
        {
          "criterion": "Legal Accuracy",
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.