T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
- check_skills.md:69
- Finding
- Remote Installer Content Is Piped Directly into Shell Interpreters<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `check_skills.md:69`; `check_hardware.md:73` **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: Critical ### Vulnerable Code ```bash # check_skills.md:69 npm install -g clawhub # Alternative: curl -fsSL https://clawhub.io/install | bash ``` ```bash # check_hardware.md:73 curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_lts.x | sudo bash - ``` ### Technical Analysis Both recommendations download mutable content from an external server and execute it immediately. There is no version pinning, checksum validation, signature verification, artifact inspection, or restriction on what the downloaded script may do. The NodeSource variant is especially dangerous because the remote response is passed to `sudo bash`, giving the downloaded script root-level execution. Although the Skill requires confirmation before applying fixes, confirmation does not establish the integrity of the effective payload. The trustworthiness of either remote endpoint or its future responses cannot be established from the audited project. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the remote server, CDN, DNS resolution, TLS termination, or publisher account. 2. The attacker changes the installer response to include malicious shell commands. 3. The health report recommends the command as a fix. 4. The user approves the fix or executes the displayed command. 5. `curl` streams the attacker-controlled response directly to `bash`. 6. The payload executes with the user's privileges or, for the NodeSource command, root privileges. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation can provide arbitrary command execution. Depending on the selected command, the attacker may obtain: - Full access to the current user account. - Root privileges through `sudo bash`. - Access to OpenClaw configuration, credentials, identity data, memory, and logs. - Installation of persistent services or scheduled tasks. - Replacement of system ...[truncated 67 chars]
- Remediation
- <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions - Remove all pipe-to-shell installation instructions. - Download a version-pinned installer or package to a local file. - Verify it against a vendor-published cryptographic signature and checksum. - Present the resolved version, source URL, checksum, and requested privileges before confirmation. - Inspect the downloaded script before execution. - Avoid root execution wherever possible. - Prefer a trusted package manager with signed repositories. - Treat failure to verify authenticity as a hard installation failure. ]]>
