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Security audit

clawd-migrate

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This migration tool mostly matches its stated purpose, but it can automatically install and run another global package while handling credentials and user files.

Install only if you are comfortable with a migration tool that reads and copies credential/config files and may modify your global npm environment. Prefer reviewing or patching it so OpenClaw setup is explicit opt-in, version-pinned, and run only after you inspect the migrated directory; avoid running it on untrusted source workspaces containing symlinks.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (4)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
__main__.py:70
Finding

Automatic Installation and Execution of an Unpinned Third-Party Package

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: __main__.py:70-74, tui.py:186-189, openclaw_setup.py:15-51
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned dependency retrieval and automatic execution
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

python
# __main__.py:70-74
# --- Always reinstall openclaw (unless user explicitly opted out via flag) ---
if setup_openclaw or not skip_verify:
    # Default behavior: reinstall openclaw at the end
    print("Reinstalling openclaw (npm i -g openclaw)...", file=sys.stderr)
    setup_result = install_openclaw_and_onboard(out_root)
python
# openclaw_setup.py:15-35
def install_openclaw_global() -> Tuple[bool, str]:
    """
    Run npm i -g openclaw. Returns (success, message).
    Uses shell=True so npm is found via the same PATH as the user's terminal (macOS/Linux).
    """
    try:
        r = subprocess.run(
            "npm install -g openclaw",
            capture_output=True,
            text=True,
            timeout=120,
            shell=True,
        )
        if r.returncode != 0:
            return False, r.stderr or r.stdout or f"npm exit code {r.returncode}"
        return True, "openclaw installed globally"
    except FileNotFoundError:
        return False, "npm not found; ensure Node.js is installed"
    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
        return False, "npm install timed out"
    except Exception as e:
        return False, str(e)
python
# openclaw_setup.py:40-60
def run_openclaw_onboard(target_dir: Path) -> Tuple[bool, str]:
    """
    Run openclaw onboard with cwd=target_dir. Returns (success, message).
    Uses shell=True so openclaw is found via PATH (e.g. /usr/local/bin on macOS).
    """
    try:
        r = subprocess.run(
            "openclaw onboard",
            cwd=str(target_dir),
            capture_output=True,
            text=True,
            timeout=60,
            shell=True
...[truncated 2761 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Make setup strictly opt-in:
    python
    if setup_openclaw:
        setup_result = install_openclaw_and_onboard(out_root)
    
  • Add a separate, default-deny confirmation before both global installation and onboarding.
  • Pin an explicitly approved package version, such as openclaw@X.Y.Z.
  • Validate package provenance and integrity before execution.
  • Use a project-local or isolated installation rather than a global installation where feasible.
  • Execute commands without a shell:
    python
    subprocess.run(
        ["npm", "install", "-g", "openclaw@X.Y.Z"],
        shell=False,
        check=False,
        ...
    )
    
  • Resolve the expected executable explicitly rather than relying on arbitrary PATH lookup.
  • Do not run onboarding until the user has reviewed which files and credentials will be accessible to it.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
HOW_TO_RUN.md:133
Finding

Documented Opt-In Setup Is Performed Automatically Without Separate Consent

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: HOW_TO_RUN.md:133-144, __main__.py:70-74, tui.py:147-189
Vulnerability Type: Security-sensitive behavior inconsistent with documented consent
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code and Documentation

text
# HOW_TO_RUN.md:133-144
Migrate your files into the openclaw layout (optionally create a backup first).
Migration does not install openclaw; it only copies your assets into
memory/, .config/openclaw/, .config/clawdbook/, and projects/.

--setup-openclaw – After migration, run npm i -g openclaw and openclaw onboard
in the output directory.

In the interactive menu, after a successful migration you’ll be prompted:
“Install openclaw and run openclaw onboard in this directory? [Y/n]”.
python
# __main__.py:70-74
# --- Always reinstall openclaw (unless user explicitly opted out via flag) ---
if setup_openclaw or not skip_verify:
    # Default behavior: reinstall openclaw at the end
    print("Reinstalling openclaw (npm i -g openclaw)...", file=sys.stderr)
    setup_result = install_openclaw_and_onboard(out_root)
python
# tui.py:147-156 and 186-189
def do_migrate(root: Path, no_backup: bool) -> None:
    """Run migration with verification, then reinstall openclaw and run onboard."""
    if not no_backup:
        print(style("  Migration will create a backup first.", DIM))
    else:
        print(style("  Skipping backup (--no-backup).", YELLOW))
    confirm = input(style("  Proceed with migration? [y/N]: ", YELLOW)).strip().lower()
    if confirm != "y" and confirm != "yes":
        print(style("  Cancelled.", DIM))
        return

    # --- Always reinstall openclaw ---
    print(style("\n  Reinstalling openclaw (npm i -g openclaw)...", CYAN))
    print(style("  This ensures you have the latest version.\n", DIM))
    setup_result = install_openclaw_and_onboard(out_root)

Technical Analysis

The primary ...[truncated 1670 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Make actual behavior match the documented opt-in model.
  • Require --setup-openclaw before any package installation or onboarding in noninteractive mode.
  • In interactive mode, use a separate default-deny prompt that clearly states:
    • A package will be downloaded from npm.
    • It will be installed globally.
    • npm lifecycle scripts may execute.
    • Onboarding will run with access to the migrated directory and credentials.
  • Add an explicit --no-setup-openclaw option if automatic behavior must be retained for backward compatibility, then transition to opt-in behavior.
  • Add automated tests asserting that ordinary migration never calls install_openclaw_and_onboard.
  • Consolidate README, Skill, setup documentation, and CLI help so they describe one consistent security model.

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
discover.py:38
Finding

Symlink Following Allows Files Outside the Selected Root to Be Copied

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: discover.py:38-44, discover.py:54-59, backup.py:43-52, migrate.py:60-65
Vulnerability Type: Unrestricted symlink dereferencing and source-root escape
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

python
# discover.py:38-44
for rel in SOURCE_CONFIG_PATHS:
    p = root / rel
    if p.exists():
        if p.is_dir():
            for f in p.rglob("*"):
                if f.is_file():
                    out["config"].append(str(f))
python
# discover.py:54-59
for rel in SOURCE_EXTRA_DIRS:
    rel_clean = rel.rstrip("/")
    extra_path = root / rel_clean
    if extra_path.is_dir():
        for f in extra_path.rglob("*"):
            if f.is_file():
                out["extra"].append(str(f))
python
# backup.py:43-52
for src in all_paths:
    src_path = Path(src)
    if not src_path.is_file():
        continue
    try:
        rel = src_path.relative_to(root)
    except ValueError:
        rel = src_path.name
    dest = backup_path / rel
    dest.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    shutil.copy2(src_path, dest)
python
# migrate.py:60-65
for src in assets.get("memory", []):
    src_path = Path(src)
    if src_path.is_file():
        dest = memory_dir / src_path.name
        try:
            shutil.copy2(src_path, dest)
            result["memory_copied"].append(str(dest))

Technical Analysis

Path.is_file() follows symbolic links. shutil.copy2() also follows symlinks by default. The code checks the lexical location of discovered paths but does not resolve each source and verify that its final target remains under the approved source root.

A symbolic link placed at an expected memory filename, inside a scanned configuration directory, or inside projects/ can therefore refer to a file outside the selected workspace. When processed, the external target's contents are c ...[truncated 1405 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Reject symbolic links during discovery:
    python
    if f.is_symlink():
        continue
    
  • Resolve every candidate and enforce containment:
    python
    resolved_root = root.resolve()
    resolved_source = src_path.resolve(strict=True)
    if not resolved_source.is_relative_to(resolved_root):
        raise ValueError(f"Source escapes migration root: {src_path}")
    
  • For Python versions without Path.is_relative_to, use relative_to inside a guarded try block.
  • Use follow_symlinks=False when copying if preserving links is explicitly supported.
  • Apply the containment check immediately before copying to reduce time-of-check/time-of-use exposure.
  • Consider opening files with platform-supported no-follow semantics where hostile local modification is in scope.
  • Record rejected symlinks in the result and require explicit user review rather than silently ignoring them.
  • Add tests for symlinked memory files, config files, project files, and symlink targets outside the source root.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
migrate.py:70
Finding

Flattened Configuration Paths Cause Silent Credential Overwrites and False Verification Success

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: migrate.py:70-90, verify.py:87-106, verify.py:153-158
Vulnerability Type: Destination path collision, silent overwrite, and insufficient verification
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

python
# migrate.py:70-90
# Clawdbook/Moltbook data: keep separate and safe (credentials, API keys)
def is_clawdbook(path_str: str) -> bool:
    p = path_str.lower()
    return "moltbook" in p or "clawdbook" in p or "moltbot" in p

for src in assets.get("config", []):
    src_path = Path(src)
    if not src_path.is_file():
        continue
    if is_clawdbook(src):
        dest = clawdbook_dir / src_path.name
        try:
            shutil.copy2(src_path, dest)
            result["clawdbook_copied"].append(str(dest))
        except Exception as e:
            result["errors"].append(f"clawdbook {src}: {e}")
    else:
        dest = config_dir / src_path.name
        try:
            shutil.copy2(src_path, dest)
            result["config_copied"].append(str(dest))
        except Exception as e:
            result["errors"].append(f"config {src}: {e}")
python
# verify.py:87-106
# --- Config files ---
for src in assets.get("config", []):
    src_path = Path(src)
    if not src_path.is_file():
        continue
    result["total_expected"] += 1
    if _is_clawdbook(src):
        dest = clawdbook_dir / src_path.name
        ftype = "clawdbook"
    else:
        dest = config_dir / src_path.name
        ftype = "config"
    entry = {"source": str(src_path), "destination": str(dest), "type": ftype}
    if dest.is_file():
        if dest.stat().st_size == src_path.stat().st_size:
            entry["size_match"] = True
        else:
            entry["size_match"] = False
        result["total_verified"] += 1
        result["verified"].append(entry)
    else:
        result["missing"].append(entry)
text
...[truncated 2405 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Preserve a safe relative path beneath the source configuration root rather than using only the basename.
  • Build a complete source-to-destination plan before copying.
  • Detect multiple sources targeting the same destination and fail closed with a clear collision report.
  • Do not overwrite existing destinations unless the user has explicitly selected an overwrite policy.
  • Verify copied files with a cryptographic digest such as SHA-256.
  • Treat any existence, size, or digest mismatch as verification failure:
    python
    size_match = dest.stat().st_size == src_path.stat().st_size
    if size_match:
        result["total_verified"] += 1
        result["verified"].append(entry)
    else:
        result["errors"].append(
            f"Size mismatch: {src_path} -> {dest}"
        )
    
  • Include uniqueness of destination paths in verification.
  • Add tests covering duplicate basenames in separate nested directories, both with equal and unequal file sizes.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
Findings (47)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · Documentation/MIGRATION_SOURCES.md (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

md
| Test | What it checks |
|------|----------------|
| `TestDiscover.test_discover_finds_memory_config_extra` | Discover returns memory (SOUL.md, USER.md, TOOLS.md), config, clawdbook, and extra (projects/) |
| `TestBackup.test_backup_creates_dir_and_copies_files` | Backup dir exists; SOUL.md, USER.md, credentials.json, projects/readme.txt, _manifest.txt present |
| `TestMigrate.test_migrate_creates_openclaw_layout` | Migration creates memory/, .config/openclaw/, .config/clawdbook/; copies memory and clawdbook; no errors; projects/ preserved |

## How to run

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · Documentation/MIGRATION_SOURCES.md (reported line 26)May include surrounding context.

md
| Test | What it checks |
|------|----------------|
| `TestDiscover.test_discover_finds_memory_config_extra` | Discover returns memory (SOUL.md, USER.md, TOOLS.md), config, clawdbook, and extra (projects/) |
| `TestBackup.test_backup_creates_dir_and_copies_files` | Backup dir exists; SOUL.md, USER.md, credentials.json, projects/readme.txt, _manifest.txt present |
| `TestMigrate.test_migrate_creates_openclaw_layout` | Migration creates memory/, .config/openclaw/, .config/clawdbook/; copies memory and clawdbook; no errors; projects/ preserved |

## How to run

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · Documentation/TESTS.md (reported line 17)May include surrounding context.

md
| Test | What it checks |
|------|----------------|
| `TestDiscover.test_discover_finds_memory_config_extra` | Discover returns memory (SOUL.md, USER.md, TOOLS.md), config, clawdbook, and extra (projects/) |
| `TestBackup.test_backup_creates_dir_and_copies_files` | Backup dir exists; SOUL.md, USER.md, credentials.json, projects/readme.txt, _manifest.txt present |
| `TestMigrate.test_migrate_creates_openclaw_layout` | Migration creates memory/, .config/openclaw/, .config/clawdbook/; copies memory and clawdbook; no errors; projects/ preserved |

## How to run

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · Documentation/VERIFICATION.md (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

md
| Test | What it checks |
|------|----------------|
| `TestDiscover.test_discover_finds_memory_config_extra` | Discover returns memory (SOUL.md, USER.md, TOOLS.md), config, clawdbook, and extra (projects/) |
| `TestBackup.test_backup_creates_dir_and_copies_files` | Backup dir exists; SOUL.md, USER.md, credentials.json, projects/readme.txt, _manifest.txt present |
| `TestMigrate.test_migrate_creates_openclaw_layout` | Migration creates memory/, .config/openclaw/, .config/clawdbook/; copies memory and clawdbook; no errors; projects/ preserved |

## How to run

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · config.py (reported line 20)May include surrounding context.

python
| Test | What it checks |
|------|----------------|
| `TestDiscover.test_discover_finds_memory_config_extra` | Discover returns memory (SOUL.md, USER.md, TOOLS.md), config, clawdbook, and extra (projects/) |
| `TestBackup.test_backup_creates_dir_and_copies_files` | Backup dir exists; SOUL.md, USER.md, credentials.json, projects/readme.txt, _manifest.txt present |
| `TestMigrate.test_migrate_creates_openclaw_layout` | Migration creates memory/, .config/openclaw/, .config/clawdbook/; copies memory and clawdbook; no errors; projects/ preserved |

## How to run

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · config.py (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

python
| Test | What it checks |
|------|----------------|
| `TestDiscover.test_discover_finds_memory_config_extra` | Discover returns memory (SOUL.md, USER.md, TOOLS.md), config, clawdbook, and extra (projects/) |
| `TestBackup.test_backup_creates_dir_and_copies_files` | Backup dir exists; SOUL.md, USER.md, credentials.json, projects/readme.txt, _manifest.txt present |
| `TestMigrate.test_migrate_creates_openclaw_layout` | Migration creates memory/, .config/openclaw/, .config/clawdbook/; copies memory and clawdbook; no errors; projects/ preserved |

## How to run

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test_migrate.py (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.

python
| Test | What it checks |
|------|----------------|
| `TestDiscover.test_discover_finds_memory_config_extra` | Discover returns memory (SOUL.md, USER.md, TOOLS.md), config, clawdbook, and extra (projects/) |
| `TestBackup.test_backup_creates_dir_and_copies_files` | Backup dir exists; SOUL.md, USER.md, credentials.json, projects/readme.txt, _manifest.txt present |
| `TestMigrate.test_migrate_creates_openclaw_layout` | Migration creates memory/, .config/openclaw/, .config/clawdbook/; copies memory and clawdbook; no errors; projects/ preserved |

## How to run

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test_migrate.py (reported line 73)May include surrounding context.

python
| Test | What it checks |
|------|----------------|
| `TestDiscover.test_discover_finds_memory_config_extra` | Discover returns memory (SOUL.md, USER.md, TOOLS.md), config, clawdbook, and extra (projects/) |
| `TestBackup.test_backup_creates_dir_and_copies_files` | Backup dir exists; SOUL.md, USER.md, credentials.json, projects/readme.txt, _manifest.txt present |
| `TestMigrate.test_migrate_creates_openclaw_layout` | Migration creates memory/, .config/openclaw/, .config/clawdbook/; copies memory and clawdbook; no errors; projects/ preserved |

## How to run

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The dangerous behavior is not user string interpolation but the explicit choice to execute a privileged package installation through the shell using environment-controlled tool resolution. In the context of an agent skill, this is more dangerous because automated execution may occur on developer machines or CI runners where PATH, npm config, or package resolution can be influenced, leading to arbitrary code execution and supply-chain compromise.

Content

Scanner excerpt · openclaw_setup.py (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

python
Uses shell=True so npm is found via the same PATH as the user's terminal (macOS/Linux).
    """
    try:
        r = subprocess.run(
            "npm install -g openclaw",
            capture_output=True,
            text=True,

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · Documentation/VERIFICATION.md (reported line 50)May include surrounding context.

bash
clawd-migrate migrate                      # verification enabled (default)
clawd-migrate migrate --skip-verify        # skip verification

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 52)May include surrounding context.

bash
clawd-migrate migrate                      # verification enabled (default)
clawd-migrate migrate --skip-verify        # skip verification

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The documentation states that after verification, the tool automatically performs npm i -g openclaw and openclaw onboard, which are system-modifying actions unrelated to verification itself. Bundling package installation and onboarding into a post-verification flow can surprise users, expand the attack surface, and lead to unintended code execution or environment changes, especially because global package installs execute code from the package supply chain.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Automatically running a global reinstall and onboarding without a prominent warning or confirmation is risky because it modifies the host system and may execute package lifecycle scripts or other installer logic. Even if intended as convenience, silent system changes violate least surprise and can be abused if dependencies or execution context are compromised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The documentation instructs users to execute npx clawd-migrate without pinning a specific package version, which causes code to be fetched and run from the npm registry at invocation time. If the package is updated maliciously, compromised, or a supply-chain attack occurs, users may execute unexpected code with their local permissions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This command again recommends npx clawd-migrate without a pinned version, which implicitly trusts the latest npm-published artifact at runtime. Because this tool also performs filesystem migration, a compromised package could read, alter, or exfiltrate local files during execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The documentation promotes an unversioned npx execution path, which is a supply-chain risk because users may run whatever code is currently published under that package name. In the context of a migration utility, this increases risk because the tool is expected to access project data and configuration files.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Using npx clawd-migrate without a fixed version allows silent drift to newer code and creates an avoidable remote code execution trust boundary with the npm registry. Because this command is part of a migration flow, any malicious update could tamper with backups, outputs, or local secrets.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This reference still uses an unpinned npx package execution model, exposing users to registry-side package changes. The risk remains meaningful even for project-local installs because the example normalizes fetching and running mutable remote code on demand.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The documentation offers --no-backup and a menu option to migrate without backup, but the warning is comparatively light for an operation that can alter user files. This increases the chance of accidental irreversible data loss or difficult recovery if migration behaves unexpectedly or is interrupted.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The example command uses unpinned npx execution for a migration-related action. This is dangerous because users are likely to trust documentation verbatim, and a compromised package could abuse the elevated trust and access to local bot files.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This backup example still fetches and runs the latest package version from npm via npx. Since backup operations typically traverse and copy large sets of local data, a hostile package version could inspect or export sensitive content unnoticed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The migration example remains unpinned, creating a classic software supply-chain exposure. Given that migration changes filesystem contents and may process configuration data, the blast radius includes integrity loss and possible disclosure of secrets.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.