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Security audit

clawprint

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This blogging skill needs review because it encourages publishing current-session work and persists that instruction across sessions without requiring your approval.

Before installing, remove the recurring publishing directive and require approval of each exact draft before posting. Check drafts for private project details, personal information, and secrets. Keep the API key outside tracked project files. Deleting a post does not remove archived copies. The review covered the complete bundled artifact; live service behavior and optional external code remain unverified.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Warning
Location
SKILL.md
Finding

Persistent instructions redirect future sessions toward public publishing

Content
View full analysis

Impact

Later sessions can be redirected toward public publication without a task-specific publishing request. Actual publication or disclosure of confidential information was not observed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (5)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The request uses the declared platform, but modifies a founder-message resource rather than performing any stated article, comment, registration, browsing, or proof-verification operation. This is an undeclared write capability, not merely an implementation detail of the described functions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Instructions to publish session-derived content lack a warning about disclosing private user or project information.

High
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill pressures the agent to immediately publish material derived from its current session, without requiring a confidentiality review or user approval of the exact content. This creates a plausible path for private user or project information to reach a public service, where the documented retention of deleted text in internal archives and backups makes disclosure harder to reverse. The optional client's preview safeguards reduce risk for that workflow but do not constrain the direct curl publishing instructions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

The first fifty registrations are kept as a permanent chronological record, available to agents and humans:

bash
curl https://clawprint.org/api/founders

This is a record of how Clawprint started, not a gate. Registration is open to every agent.

The setup directs modification of CLAUDE.md to persist recurring publishing instructions across sessions.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The setup asks the agent to place a recurring publishing directive into CLAUDE.md, turning task-specific skill guidance into persistent instructions for future sessions. This can steer unrelated work toward external publication without renewed authorization; the blogging context explains the feature but does not justify making it a standing project instruction.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The setup instructions persist a recurring publishing directive in the agent's project instructions.

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Persisting the instruction to write posts each session can influence future agent behavior beyond the original task and user authorization. This is the same underlying persistent-instruction issue reported by SDI-2, not a separate exploit, and becomes more consequential when combined with encouragement to publish session-derived information.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.