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Security audit

RFC文档服务

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill advertises public RFC reading but requires and stores a third-party API key and routes requests through an unrelated proxy service.

Install only if you are comfortable giving this skill a xiaobenyang API key, having that key stored in a local plaintext .env file, and sending RFC queries through mcp.xiaobenyang.com instead of directly to IETF sources. Prefer a version that clearly discloses the proxy, avoids plaintext credential persistence, pins dependencies, and removes unrelated gaokao/school-search artifacts.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/config.py:45
Finding

API Key Persisted in a Plaintext Environment File

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: scripts/config.py, lines 45-67
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext sensitive-data storage
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

python
def save_api_key_to_env(api_key: str) -> bool:
    """将API key保存到.env文件"""
    try:
        env_path = Path(".env")
        lines = []
        if env_path.exists():
            lines = env_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
        found = False
        new_lines = []
        for line in lines:
            if line.startswith("XBY_APIKEY="):
                new_lines.append(f"XBY_APIKEY={api_key}")
                found = True
            else:
                new_lines.append(line)
        if not found:
            new_lines.append(f"XBY_APIKEY={api_key}")
        env_path.write_text("\n".join(new_lines) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
        os.environ["XBY_APIKEY"] = api_key
        return True
    except Exception as e:
        print(f"保存API key失败: {e}")
        return False

The persistence requirement is also specified in SKILL.md, lines 15-17 and 25-27, which directs the agent to collect a key from the user and call scripts.config.set_api_key() to save it.

Technical Analysis

The supplied API credential is written directly to .env as plaintext. The code relies on ambient process permissions and does not explicitly enforce owner-only access, protect against symbolic-link replacement, use an operating-system credential store, or ensure that .env is excluded from source control.

The file path is relative to the process working directory. Consequently, the secret may be written into a shared, backed-up, or version-controlled directory. Existing files are also rewritten without checking whether .env is a symbolic link.

Attack Path

  1. The Skill asks the user to provide an Xiaobenyang API key.
  2. set_api_key() passes the key to save_api_key_to_env().
  3. The function wri ...[truncated 1030 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Prefer session-only credential handling or an operating-system credential manager instead of writing the key to the project directory.
  • If persistence is essential, obtain explicit user consent and explain the storage location and risks.
  • Create the credential file atomically with owner-only permissions such as 0600; verify and repair permissions on existing files.
  • Reject symbolic links and non-regular files before reading or replacing .env.
  • Store credentials in a user-specific configuration directory rather than the current working directory.
  • Add .env to .gitignore and provide automated secret-scanning checks for commits.
  • Avoid copying the credential into additional process state unless required, and provide a documented mechanism to delete or rotate it.
  • Never include the key in logs, exceptions, telemetry, or API response data.

other

Warning
Location
scripts/call_api.py:53
Finding

RFC Queries and Identifying Credentials Are Routed Through an Undisclosed Third-Party Proxy

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: scripts/call_api.py, lines 53-75; scripts/config.py, lines 18-21; scripts/tools.py, lines 14-61; SKILL.md, lines 2-8
Vulnerability Type: Privacy exposure and least-privilege network-access mismatch
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

scripts/config.py defines a third-party service rather than an official IETF endpoint:

python
# API配置
base_url: str = "https://mcp.xiaobenyang.com"
mcp_id: str = "1820705335657482"
api_key: str = ""

scripts/call_api.py sends the identifying API credential and complete tool parameters to that service:

python
url = f"{settings.base_url}/api"
mcp_id = mcp_id or settings.mcp_id

api_key = get_api_key()
if not api_key:
    raise UpstreamError("API密钥未设置,请先调用 set_api_key()")

headers = {
    "XBY-APIKEY": api_key,
    "func": tool_name,
    "mcpid": mcp_id,
    "Content-Type": "application/json",
}

t0 = time.time()
try:
    resp = self._session.post(
        url=url,
        headers=headers,
        data=json.dumps(params),
        timeout=settings.timeout_seconds,
    )
    resp.raise_for_status()

The transmitted parameters originate in scripts/tools.py and include RFC search text and requested document sections:

python
arguments = {
    "query": query,
    "limit": limit
}

return call_api("1777316659312643", "search_rfcs", arguments)
python
arguments = {
    "number": number,
    "section": section
}

return call_api("1777316659312643", "get_rfc_section", arguments)

Technical Analysis

The Skill is described as a service for obtaining RFC documents from ietf.org, but the implementation does not directly contact an official IETF resource. Every supported operation is instead sent to mcp.xiaobenyang.com, together with an API key that permits the intermediary to correlate requests with a particular credential or account. ...[truncated 2163 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Retrieve public RFC content directly from documented official IETF endpoints where feasible.
  • If the third-party proxy is an essential architectural dependency, explicitly disclose:
    • The identity of the recipient.
    • Every data field transmitted.
    • That the API key identifies or authenticates the request.
    • Applicable retention, logging, and privacy policies.
  • Obtain informed user consent before sending queries to the intermediary.
  • Validate RFC numbers, section identifiers, formats, search-query lengths, and result limits before transmission.
  • Enforce an allowlist of approved API origins and prevent environment configuration from silently redirecting credentials to arbitrary hosts.
  • Separate credentials by host and refuse to attach XBY-APIKEY following cross-origin redirects.
  • Apply data-minimization controls and avoid sending metadata not required for the selected operation.
  • Document a direct-IETF fallback that does not require a third-party account or credential.

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Note
Location
requirements.txt:1
Finding

Dependencies Are Not Pinned to Audited Versions

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: requirements.txt, lines 1-4
Vulnerability Type: Unbounded dependency resolution
Risk Level: Low

Vulnerable Code

text
requests>=2.31.0
pydantic>=2.7.0
pydantic-settings>=2.2.0
python-dotenv>=1.0.1

Technical Analysis

Every dependency uses a lower-bound-only constraint. Package installation can therefore resolve to future releases that were not part of this audit. This prevents reproducible builds and expands the trust boundary to any later package version selected by the package index and resolver.

The reviewed package names are established packages, and no typosquatting, dependency-confusion name, custom package index, or known malicious package was identified in the supplied project. The issue is therefore prospective supply-chain exposure rather than evidence that the current dependencies are malicious.

Attack Path

  1. A user or deployment system installs the dependencies at a later date.
  2. The resolver selects versions newer than those reviewed by the project author.
  3. A selected version contains a malicious release, compromised maintainer artifact, or newly introduced exploitable behavior.
  4. Package installation or import executes or exposes the affected dependency code within the Skill process.
  5. That code receives the same filesystem, environment, and network privileges as the process, potentially including access to the plaintext API key.

Impact Assessment

A compromised dependency could execute with the privileges of the installation or runtime process. Depending on those ambient privileges, this could permit access to project files, environment variables, the persisted API credential, and outbound network connectivity.

No current compromise is established by the audited files, and exact privileges depend on the deployment environment. The confirmed weakness is the absence of reproducible, reviewed dependency res ...[truncated 8 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Pin every direct and transitive dependency to an explicitly reviewed version.
  • Generate a lock file using a controlled dependency-management workflow.
  • Require cryptographic hashes for downloaded artifacts where the packaging tool supports them.
  • Install from the official package index or an authenticated internal mirror with strict source configuration.
  • Use automated vulnerability and provenance scanning in CI.
  • Review dependency updates before merging and test them in an isolated environment.
  • Periodically regenerate pins so security updates are adopted deliberately rather than through unconstrained resolution.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (30)

Tp2

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The documented workflow includes credential management, local secret persistence, and targeting an unrelated upstream service rather than ietf.org, all of which materially differ from the advertised RFC-document function. In context, this is more dangerous because users would reasonably expect a read-only public-document retriever, not a credentialed proxy that stores secrets locally.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The documented workflow includes credential management, local secret persistence, and targeting an unrelated upstream service rather than ietf.org, all of which materially differ from the advertised RFC-document function. In context, this is more dangerous because users would reasonably expect a read-only public-document retriever, not a credentialed proxy that stores secrets locally.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Requiring users to provide an API key for an unrelated external service, despite claiming to retrieve public RFCs from ietf.org, is a strong indicator of deceptive behavior or credential harvesting risk. The danger is amplified because the instructions explicitly direct the agent to solicit, persist, and then use the secret, creating a clear path for unnecessary secret collection.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The workflow documentation references unrelated school-search tooling, indicating copy-paste artifacts or hidden broader functionality inconsistent with an RFC reader. This inconsistency undermines trust in the skill’s declared scope and suggests the agent may be directed to invoke tools outside the expected domain, increasing the risk of misuse or unintended data handling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

技能清单将该服务描述为“从ietf.org网站获取、解析和阅读RFC文档”的MCP服务器,但本文件实际实现的是向可配置 base_url 的 /api 端点发送 POST 请求,并通过 func/mcpid 头部调用任意上游工具。代码中既没有与 ietf.org 或 RFC 文档相关的专用访问、解析或阅读逻辑,也没有将能力限制在RFC场景内,说明实际行为更像通用远程工具代理。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The method exposes a generic remote tool invocation primitive driven by caller-controlled mcp_id, tool_name, and params, while the skill is presented as an RFC document service. In this context, that creates an unexpected capability expansion: a user or chained agent may be able to invoke arbitrary upstream MCP tools unrelated to RFC retrieval, increasing the risk of privilege misuse, data exfiltration, or execution of unintended remote actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The configuration is clearly mismatched to the advertised RFC document service: it references a different service name, a different environment-variable namespace, a hardcoded remote base URL, and an unrelated MCP identifier. In a skill/plugin context, this creates supply-chain and data-routing risk because operators may believe they are deploying a harmless RFC reader while the code is configured to communicate with an unrelated external service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/config.py (reported line 13)May include surrounding context.

python
model_config = SettingsConfigDict(
        env_prefix="XBY_GAOKAO_",
        env_file=".env",
        env_file_encoding="utf-8",
        extra="ignore",
    )

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

The code manually reads the .env file and force-loads a specific API key outside normal settings management, which broadens secret-handling logic and bypasses clearer, declarative configuration paths. In the context of a supposedly simple RFC-reading skill, this unnecessary secret extraction from local files raises suspicion and increases the chance of mishandling or unintended credential use.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/config.py (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.

python
default_year: int = 2025

    def model_post_init(self, __context):
        # 强制从 .env 文件读取 XBY_APIKEY
        env_path = Path(".env")
        if env_path.exists():
            content = env_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

The explicit existence check and direct read of .env are part of custom secret-access logic that is unnecessary for the advertised functionality and expands the attack surface for credential handling mistakes. Although local file reads are not inherently malicious, in this skill context they support unrelated API-key management and therefore make the mismatch more dangerous.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/config.py (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

python
def model_post_init(self, __context):
        # 强制从 .env 文件读取 XBY_APIKEY
        env_path = Path(".env")
        if env_path.exists():
            content = env_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
            for line in content.splitlines():

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/config.py (reported line 39)May include surrounding context.

python
if line.startswith("XBY_APIKEY="):
                    self.api_key = line.split("=", 1)[1].strip()
                    break
        # 如果环境变量有值,覆盖 .env 的值
        env_val = os.getenv("XBY_APIKEY", "")
        if env_val:
            self.api_key = env_val

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This function persists an API key into .env, creating durable local secret storage that may be exposed through backups, multi-user systems, or accidental repository inclusion. In a skill that claims to read public RFC documents, adding credential persistence for an unrelated external service significantly raises trust and supply-chain concerns.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/config.py (reported line 48)May include surrounding context.

python
def save_api_key_to_env(api_key: str) -> bool:
    """将API key保存到.env文件"""
    try:
        env_path = Path(".env")
        lines = []
        if env_path.exists():
            lines = env_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill declares no explicit tool scope or permission boundaries while its documented/project capabilities imply access to environment variables, file reads/writes, and network calls. In an agent setting, missing scope declarations increase the chance of overbroad tool access and make it harder to enforce least privilege, especially since the skill also handles API keys and external requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill instructions are written entirely in Chinese and present mandatory operating requirements in that language, without offering the user any language choice or stating that the skill is region- or locale-specific. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without opt-in is a natural-language policy violation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The project structure identifies the project as a gaokao skill, which conflicts with the RFC-service description and suggests repurposed or mislabeled code. While this alone may be a documentation artifact, in combination with the external API key workflow and third-party service references it increases the likelihood that the packaged skill does more than advertised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

XiaoBenYangClient 的类文档字符串和 call_api 的函数文档都明确表述其用途是调用“小笨羊MCP API/工具”,这与技能清单中“RFC文档服务”的专用定位不一致。这里不是简单的文档不完整,而是代码内文档主动指向另一种、更通用的服务意图。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This code accesses a sensitive credential via get_api_key() and sends it in the XBY-APIKEY header during a network request. While the module has internal logging, there is no confirmation prompt, user-facing warning, or explanatory comment/docstring disclosing that credentials and request data will be sent to an external API.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The class docstring uses Chinese-only natural-language labeling, indicating a language-specific skill presentation without any visible user choice or locale justification in this file. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without opt-in can be a locale-policy violation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

This file implements credential loading, persistence, and retrieval for an external API even though the stated skill purpose is RFC retrieval from ietf.org, which normally does not require such secrets. That mismatch increases the chance of covert data exfiltration, unauthorized remote dependency, or user confusion about what external service is being trusted with requests or metadata.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The code writes the supplied API key directly into a local .env file without warning, consent, permission hardening, or storage guidance. Persisting secrets silently increases exposure to accidental source control commits, local disclosure to other users/processes, and long-lived credential retention beyond the user’s intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Unpinned Dependencies

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The dependency is specified with a lower-bound only (requests>=2.31.0), so builds may resolve to different versions over time. This weakens reproducibility and makes it impossible to reliably determine whether a deployed environment includes a vulnerable release, especially for a network-facing package like requests.

Content

Scanner excerpt · requirements.txt (reported line 1)May include surrounding context.

text
requests>=2.31.0
pydantic>=2.7.0
pydantic-settings>=2.2.0
python-dotenv>=1.0.1

Unverifiable Dependency: requests has 16 known advisory(ies) (CVE-2014-1830 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor in Requests); CVE-2024-47081 (Requests vulnerable to .netrc credentials leak via malicious URLs); CVE-2024-35195 (Requests `Session` object does not verify requests after making first request wi) +13 more), but the manifest does not pin a version, so it is unknown whether the installed release is affected

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

requests has multiple known advisories, but the manifest does not pin an exact version, so it is impossible to verify from this file whether the installed release is affected. In a skill that fetches RFC documents over the network, this uncertainty matters more because requests is directly exposed to remote input and URL handling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Unpinned Dependencies

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

pydantic>=2.7.0 is unpinned, allowing future installs to select any newer version. This creates supply-chain and patch-validation risk because security posture and behavior can change without review, and known vulnerable versions cannot be ruled out from the manifest alone.

Content

Scanner excerpt · requirements.txt (reported line 2)May include surrounding context.

text
requests>=2.31.0
pydantic>=2.7.0
pydantic-settings>=2.2.0
python-dotenv>=1.0.1

Unverifiable Dependency: pydantic has 4 known advisory(ies) (CVE-2021-29510 (Use of "infinity" as an input to datetime and date fields causes infinite loop i); CVE-2024-3772 (Pydantic regular expression denial of service); CVE-2021-29510 (Pydantic is a data validation and settings management using Python type hinting.) +1 more), but the manifest does not pin a version, so it is unknown whether the installed release is affected

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

pydantic has published advisories, but the unpinned requirement prevents confirming whether deployed environments use a safe version. This creates a dependency-risk gap: even if the code is otherwise safe, installs may silently resolve to a version with known denial-of-service or parsing issues.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.