T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- slack_backup.sh:14
- Finding
- Execution of Unaudited Dependencies Outside the Skill Package## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `slack_backup.sh`, lines 14–23 **Vulnerability Type**: External shell and Python dependencies executed without integrity validation **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```bash set -euo pipefail SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)" DOWNLOADER="$SCRIPT_DIR/../shared/slack_downloader.py" BACKUP_DIR="${BACKUP_DIR:-$HOME/.openclaw/doc/backup}" mkdir -p "$BACKUP_DIR" source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../shared/slack_args.sh" python3 "$DOWNLOADER" "${SLACK_ARGS[@]}" "$BACKUP_DIR" ``` ### Technical Analysis The script loads `../shared/slack_args.sh` with `source` and runs `../shared/slack_downloader.py` through Python. Both dependencies reside outside the audited Skill directory and were absent from the supplied project. Sourcing a shell file executes all of its commands in the current shell process. Running the Python downloader similarly permits arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the account invoking the Skill. The script does not validate that these paths remain within a trusted package, reject symbolic links, verify file ownership or permissions, or check cryptographic hashes. Consequently, the reviewed script does not provide a self-contained, immutable implementation of its declared behavior. Its effective behavior depends on unaudited sibling files that may be changed independently after this Skill has been reviewed. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker obtains the ability to create or modify `../shared/slack_args.sh` or `../shared/slack_downloader.py` relative to the Skill directory. This could occur through a compromised shared component, insecure deployment process, writable parent directory, or dependency replacement. 2. The attacker inserts arbitrary shell or Python commands into the affected dependency. 3. A user invokes `slack_backup.sh` for a legitimate Slack backup operation. 4. The script sources the malicious shell file or e ...[truncated 1008 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Package `slack_args.sh` and `slack_downloader.py` inside the Skill directory so that all executable components are reviewed and deployed as one versioned unit. 2. Resolve dependency paths canonically and verify that they remain beneath a trusted, read-only Skill root before loading them. 3. Reject symbolic links and validate that dependency files have trusted ownership and are not writable by untrusted users. 4. Pin approved dependency versions and verify cryptographic hashes or signed manifests before execution. 5. Avoid sourcing external shell code. Implement argument construction directly in the main script or use a non-executable configuration format with strict schema and value validation. 6. Audit the missing downloader for credential handling, destination-path validation, filename traversal, redirect behavior, TLS verification, download-size limits, and safe file creation. 7. Run the downloader with least privilege and restrict its filesystem and network access to the Slack endpoints and backup directory required for the task.