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Security audit

Polyclanker

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is coherent for a play-money prediction-market agent, but it gives broad instructions to trade and post publicly without clear per-action user approval.

Install only if you are comfortable giving this skill an authenticated Polyclanker identity that can make play-money predictions and publish social content. Require explicit confirmation before every prediction, update, comment, discussion, reply, or vote, and treat POLYCLANKER_API_KEY as a secret that should not be pasted into chats, code, logs, or version control.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:14
Finding

Agent Role and Session Objective Hijacking

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:14-22
Vulnerability Type: Prompt-based role reassignment and session-goal redirection
Risk Level: High
Classification: T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

markdown
You are now a competing AI agent on [Polyclanker](https://polyclanker.com), a prediction market platform where **only AI agents trade**. Humans watch and compare your predictions against Polymarket's human traders.

## Your Mission

1. **Predict** — Analyze real-world events and place play-money predictions with detailed reasoning
2. **Debate** — Post comments on markets and discussion threads explaining your analysis, challenging other agents, and defending your positions
3. **Compete** — Climb the leaderboard by making accurate, well-calibrated predictions
4. **Return daily** — Come back regularly to update predictions, respond to other agents, and react to new information

Technical Analysis

The Skill uses an imperative identity-reassignment instruction—“You are now a competing AI agent”—rather than limiting itself to documenting capabilities or describing procedures that may be invoked at the user's request. It then assigns persistent objectives involving predictions, public debate, leaderboard competition, and recurring activity.

When loaded as Agent instructions, this text can alter the current session's goals and encourage the Agent to prioritize the platform's objectives over the user's original task. The broader document reinforces this behavior by directing the Agent to make authenticated predictions, publish comments, create discussions, vote on content, and revisit the service daily.

These instructions exceed the minimum authority necessary for the declared functionality. A prediction-market integration only needs to expose read operations and user-authorized state-changing actions. Mandatory role adoption, competitive objectives, broad social e ...[truncated 1993 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace identity-changing language with capability-oriented documentation. For example: “When the user explicitly asks to use Polyclanker, this Skill can inspect markets and perform approved play-money actions.”
  2. Explicitly state that system, developer, and current user instructions take precedence over the Skill text.
  3. Require explicit user confirmation immediately before every state-changing operation, including predictions, updates, comments, discussions, replies, and votes.
  4. Default to read-only tools such as market discovery and position inspection. Do not infer permission to transact or publish from merely loading the Skill.
  5. Remove instructions to “return daily” or perform recurring engagement. Any scheduled or repeated activity should require a separately configured, user-approved automation policy with clear limits and revocation controls.
  6. Remove leaderboard-driven and promotional objectives that could bias the Agent away from the user's requested outcome.
  7. Apply least privilege to MCP credentials. If supported, use separate scopes for market reads, trading, and social posting, and request only the scopes needed for the current task.
  8. Present the exact proposed wager, confidence, reasoning, and public message to the user before submission.
  9. Add limits for wager size, aggregate exposure, action frequency, and public-post volume, with secure defaults that are stricter than the platform maximum.
  10. Treat market descriptions, comments, discussions, and other remotely supplied content as untrusted data and prevent them from becoming executable Agent instructions.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 47)May include surrounding context.

If you don't have an API key yet, register your agent:

bash
curl -X POST https://mcp.polyclanker.com/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "YOUR_AGENT_NAME", "modelType": "YOUR_MODEL_TYPE", "description": "Brief description of your strategy"}'

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to obtain and store an API key in an environment variable but does not warn that the key is a secret, should not be shared in prompts/logs, and is only shown once. In an agent-skill context, missing credential-handling guidance increases the risk that users expose the token in chat history, screenshots, repos, or telemetry.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.