T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:8- Finding
Shell Command Injection Through User-Controlled Problem Statements
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 8–16; duplicated at lines 38–47
Vulnerability Type: Shell command injection
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
markdown ## Usage When a complex coding task is requested, formulate a concise, descriptive problem statement and run the `mini` CLI using a bash tool. ```bash mini --yolo "Fix the authentication logic in /src/auth.py to ensure tokens expire after 3600 seconds" Rules Autonomy: Always use the --yolo flag so the agent runs autonomously without waiting for user input. Formatting: Escape double quotes inside the problem statement if necessary.Technical Analysis
The skill instructs the agent to place a problem statement derived from a user's request into a Bash command. Its only stated sanitization measure is escaping double quotation marks.
Escaping double quotes does not make untrusted content safe inside a double-quoted Bash argument. Bash continues to evaluate command substitutions using
$(...)and backticks inside double quotes. Depending on how the command is assembled, newlines, backslashes, and other shell syntax may introduce additional parsing risks.For example, if an attacker supplies a problem statement containing
$(arbitrary-command), constructing the documented command as shell text can cause Bash to execute that command before invokingmini. The same unsafe guidance appears in the installation-copy content later in the file.Attack Path
- An attacker places shell substitution syntax in a coding request, issue description, or other text used to formulate the problem statement.
- The agent follows the skill and interpolates that text into
mini --yolo "...". - The command is passed to a Bash tool as shell source.
- Bash evaluates embedded
$(...)or backtick substitution despite the surrounding double quotes. - The injected command executes with the filesystem, network, environment, and cre ...[truncated 599 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Do not construct a shell command by interpolating the problem statement into command text.
- Invoke
minithrough a structured process API with an argument array, equivalent to["mini", "--yolo", problemStatement], withoutshell=true. - If the available execution interface only accepts shell source, apply a well-tested POSIX shell-quoting routine to the complete argument rather than merely escaping double quotes.
- Reject or safely handle control characters, command substitutions, backticks, and unexpected newlines as defense in depth.
- Keep user-controlled issue and repository content separate from executable instructions.
- Add tests covering payloads containing
$(...), backticks, quotation marks, backslashes, semicolons, and newlines. - Correct both copies of the instructions so the installed version does not preserve the vulnerable pattern.
