T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/sandbox-cmd.sh:5- Finding
Unauthenticated Plaintext Command-Control API
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/sandbox-cmd.sh, lines 5–50
Vulnerability Type: Unauthenticated plaintext transmission of privileged API operations
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
bash API_URL="http://protocol-spaces-api:3000" call_api() { local method=$1 local endpoint=$2 local extra_args=("${@:3}") local response response=$(curl -s -X "$method" "$API_URL$endpoint" "${extra_args[@]}" 2>&1) local curl_exit=$? if [ $curl_exit -ne 0 ]; then echo "{\"success\":false,\"error\":\"Cannot reach API ($curl_exit): $response\"}" return 1 fi echo "$response" } case "$ACTION" in status) result=$(call_api GET /is_sandbox_start) || { echo "false"; exit 1; } echo "$result" | jq -r '.is_running' ;; start) call_api POST /start | jq . ;; stop) call_api POST /stop | jq . ;; reset) call_api POST /reset | jq . ;; exec) if [ $# -eq 0 ]; then echo '{"success":false,"error":"No command provided"}' exit 1 fi JSON_CMD=$(jq -nc --args '$ARGS.positional' -- "$@") response=$(call_api POST /execute \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"cmd\":$JSON_CMD}")Technical Analysis
The wrapper sends sandbox lifecycle operations and arbitrary command requests to
http://protocol-spaces-api:3000. Plain HTTP provides neither transport confidentiality nor authenticated server identity. No authorization token, client certificate, request signature, or other application-level authentication is attached to the requests.The
/executerequest may contain sensitive penetration-testing arguments, including target addresses, URLs, usernames, passwords, tokens, or other operational data. A party capable of observing the relevant network traffic can read these values. A party capable of manipulating routing, name resolution, or traffic can im ...[truncated 2429 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace plain HTTP with HTTPS and require strict certificate and hostname validation.
- Prefer mutual TLS for service-to-service communication so both the client and API authenticate one another.
- Require short-lived, narrowly scoped authorization credentials on every endpoint. Separate command-execution permission from lifecycle permissions such as
resetandstop. - Bind the API to a private interface or local transport where feasible, and enforce firewall or network-policy restrictions so only the intended client can connect.
- Apply server-side authorization regardless of network isolation; do not treat possession of network access as authentication.
- Enforce sandbox isolation and least privilege on the server, including a non-root runtime, restricted Linux capabilities, resource limits, filesystem controls, and appropriate seccomp or mandatory-access-control policies.
- Avoid passing credentials directly in command-line arguments. Use protected secret injection mechanisms and redact sensitive values from logs and errors.
- Validate response structure and handle malformed or unauthenticated responses as failures. Authenticated response integrity should come from TLS and, where warranted, application-level signing.
- Rotate any credentials that may previously have been transmitted over this plaintext channel after secure transport is deployed.