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Security audit

Second Read Editor

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This editing skill keeps revisions under author control and clearly discloses its optional file searches and product checks.

Use a narrowly selected project folder and keep generated HTML private because it embeds the supplied draft and context. Enable command or network checks only after reviewing every command and destination; use a disposable checkout and temporary credentials as documented. Expect Canonical/US English documentation suggestions. All bundled files were inspected, including the scanner's partial-coverage areas; runtime behavior and host permission enforcement were not tested.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (5)

Env Variable Harvesting

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Code enumerates, copies, or searches environment variables for secrets. Bulk environment access can collect credentials unrelated to the skill's stated purpose.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/knowledge_context.py (reported line 226)May include surrounding context.

python
score += 2
            signals.append("same_folder")
        name = Path(rel).stem.casefold().replace("-", " ").replace("_", " ")
        if any(token == name or token in name.split() for token in IMPORTANT):
            if Path(rel).parts[:1] == Path(key).parts[:1] or Path(rel).parent == Path("."):
                score += 4
                signals.append("potential_project_index_or_rules")

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: file_read, file_write, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Enforces US English for every documentation artifact without user opt-in.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The instructions mandate Canonical's writing conventions for every documentation artifact and explicitly include US English. Calling this a product choice does not establish a locale-specific need or let authors preserve their chosen language or regional conventions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

scripts/product_verify.py implements arbitrary command execution beyond the stated editorial scope (L112–L125).

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes proofreading and resolving context from relevant files, permitted workspace tools, or official sources, but this branch executes any argv supplied by a claims manifest as a local program. The explicit --allow-exec gate reduces accidental execution, yet this general-purpose execution capability is neither declared nor an obvious requirement of editorial review; shell=False and a fixed working directory do not restrict what the program can access or modify.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/product_verify.py (reported line 123)May include surrounding context.

python
# No shell, fixed working directory and stdin closed. Execution remains
        # potentially consequential, so the opt-in is deliberately explicit.
        try:
            proc = subprocess.run(args, shell=False, cwd=root, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
                                  capture_output=True, timeout=min(float(spec.get("timeout", 5)), 15),
                                  check=False)
        except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as ex: