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Security audit

Grafana

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This Grafana skill is a disclosed, purpose-aligned integration, with meaningful but expected write and credential risks that are documented and gated by user approval.

Install only if you trust Maton and the package sources, prefer OAuth over API keys, use a least-privilege Grafana account, verify connection IDs before writes, and review carefully before approving deletes, data source changes, team changes, or any use of the broader maton api passthrough.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:42
Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Installation## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:42`, `SKILL.md:700`, and `SKILL.md:714` **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party dependencies **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```bash npm install -g @maton/cli ``` ```bash pip install maton-ai ``` ```bash npm install @maton/sdk ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill instructs users or agents to install executable third-party packages without pinning reviewed versions or verifying package integrity. Each command resolves the package and its transitive dependencies at installation time, so the installed code can differ from the code available when this Skill was audited. The dependencies are relevant to the declared Grafana integration and are obtained through standard package managers. There is no evidence that the named packages are currently malicious, misspelled, or downloaded from an intentionally unsafe source. Nevertheless, the mutable installation process creates supply-chain exposure. A compromised maintainer account, malicious package release, dependency confusion issue, or compromised transitive dependency could cause arbitrary package code or installation hooks to run locally. Global installation of `@maton/cli` increases potential exposure because it places a mutable executable on the user's command path. The document also relies on this CLI or the optional SDKs for authenticated Maton and Grafana operations. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises one of the named packages, its maintainer account, publication pipeline, or a transitive dependency. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release that satisfies the unpinned installation command. 3. A user or agent follows the Skill instructions after the malicious release becomes current. 4. The package manager downloads and installs the attacker-controlled version. 5. Malicious installation hooks or runtime code execute with the privileges of the user running the package manager. 6. The malicious component may inspect local ...[truncated 1012 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin every package to an exact, reviewed version, for example: ```bash npm install -g @maton/cli@<reviewed-version> pip install maton-ai==<reviewed-version> npm install @maton/sdk@<reviewed-version> ``` 2. Publish and verify integrity hashes or checksums for approved releases where the package ecosystem supports them. 3. Use lockfiles with integrity metadata for project-local SDK dependencies and commit the reviewed lockfiles. 4. Prefer local, isolated installation over global installation unless a global CLI is operationally necessary. 5. Install packages only from explicitly trusted registries, and document the expected publisher and package provenance. 6. Review package lifecycle scripts and transitive dependencies before approving version upgrades. 7. Use a virtual environment or restricted container for Python dependencies and a dedicated project directory for Node.js dependencies. 8. Run installation and API tooling as an unprivileged user. Do not use elevated privileges unless explicitly required. 9. Maintain a tested allowlist of versions and introduce a controlled dependency-update process with security review.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.