T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Note
- Location
scripts/script.sh:6- Finding
Insufficient Permission Hardening for Locally Stored User Input
- Content
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> "$DATA_DIR/history.log"; } ``` A representative command handler is: ```bash run) shift if [ $# -eq 0 ]; then echo "Recent run entries:" tail -20 "$DATA_DIR/run.log" 2>/dev/null || echo " No entries yet. Use: beat run " else local input="$*" local ts=$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M') echo "$ts|$input" >> "$DATA_DIR/run.log" local total=$(wc -l < "$DATA_DIR/run.log") echo " [Beat] run: $input" echo " Saved. Total run entries: $total" _log "run" "$input" fi ;; ``` Equivalent plaintext logging logic appears in the `check`, `convert`, `analyze`, `generate`, `preview`, `batch`, `compare`, `export`, `config`, `status`, and `report` handlers through line 289. ### Technical Analysis The script creates `~/.local/share/beat` and its log files without setting a restrictive umask or explicitly applying secure filesystem modes. Consequently, directory and file permissions depend on the caller's existing umask and on any pre-existing directory permissions. The command handlers accept arbitrary text and are designed to store it in command-specific log files and `history.log`. If users provide sensitive configuration values, private filenames, tokens, or other confidential text, those values are retained unencrypted. Under a permissive umask or insecure pre-existing permissions, another local account may be able to read them. The affected handlers currently contain an independent functional defect: they use `local` outside a function. In Bash, this normally fails, and `set -e` may terminate the script before the subsequent write. This limits i ...[truncated 1790 chars]- Remediation
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