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Security audit

Security Constitution

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a disclosed security-control layer, but it needs review because it tries to govern every agent request and asks users to provide approval passwords in chat.

Review this skill carefully before installing. It may be useful only in a controlled environment where the policy file, owner identity, hooks, notifications, logs, and approval flow are protected outside the model. Do not use a reusable password through chat transcripts; use an external approval mechanism instead.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:12
Finding

Unbypassable Global Agent Control Through Skill Instructions

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:65
Finding

Plaintext Password Collection Through Conversation Messages

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (5)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

All user-facing instructions, prompts, and response templates are specified only in Chinese, and the document does not state that this is a region-specific skill or provide any opt-in language choice. That creates a natural-language policy concern if organizational policy requires language choice rather than forcing a single locale.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The risk-classification flow relies on keyword matching but does not define constrained patterns, context rules, or disambiguation. Broad natural-language triggers can be bypassed with paraphrasing or can over-match harmless requests, causing both false negatives for dangerous actions and false positives that degrade trust in the control layer.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The L1 refusal template says users can 'directly edit the configuration file' if they need to perform a blocked action, which undermines the stated guarantee that the security constitution cannot be bypassed. In a system where the policy file controls owner identity, passwords, and risk behavior, directing users to edit configuration creates a documented bypass path for protections that are supposed to be absolute.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

The document claims that changing the owner, password, or bypassing security is impossible, while also stating that security decisions depend on values loaded from a user-editable policy file in the home directory. If the effective owner ID or password is sourced from that file, an attacker or local user with write access could redefine trust and weaken the security model despite the 'absolute lock' claim.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
77% confidence
Finding

The markdown clearly mentions logging and password confirmation, but it also instructs the skill to read configuration from ~/.openclaw/workspace/security-policy.json and a compatibility file. Accessing files in the user's home directory can affect privacy and system expectations, and that behavior is not explicitly called out as a user-facing warning.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.