Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a coherent Rentaclaw marketplace integration, but users should understand it can publish and modify live agent listings and share a dedicated webhook token with Rentaclaw.
Install only if you intend to manage a live Rentaclaw listing from OpenClaw. Use a Rentaclaw-specific API key and a dedicated, limited OpenClaw hook token, verify prices and status changes before asking the agent to update a listing, and avoid reusing a gateway token that grants broader access than renters need.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
const RENTACLAW_API_URL = 'https://www.rentaclaw.io/api/public';
// Get API key from environment (set via credentials in SKILL.md)
function getApiKey(): string {
const apiKey = process.env.RENTACLAW_API_KEY;
if (!apiKey) {
The README instructs users to list, update, pause, and resume marketplace agents, but it does not clearly warn that these commands can change publicly visible marketplace state or affect live commercial listings. In an agent-driven environment, users may issue natural-language commands without realizing they trigger external side effects, which increases the risk of unintended publication, pricing changes, or service disruption.
The skill declares access to environment variables and network destinations but does not define an explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This weakens policy enforcement and reviewability, making it easier for the skill to access sensitive secrets like RENTACLAW_API_KEY, OPENCLAW_WEBHOOK_URL, and OPENCLAW_HOOK_TOKEN or perform network actions beyond what operators may expect.
The listing function collects local OpenClaw integration details and sends them to the external Rentaclaw API, including a webhook URL and hook token. Transmitting a hook token to a third-party marketplace expands secret exposure and can enable unauthorized invocation of the local agent webhook if the external service is compromised, logs request bodies, or mishandles stored data.
This code sends webhook configuration and the hook token to an external API without any runtime warning or consent mechanism. Because the token likely authenticates inbound calls to the agent, exposing it to a third party creates a secret-sharing vulnerability and increases the risk of unauthorized access, replay, or abuse of the agent interface.
Using toLocaleString() without specifying locale or giving the user a choice can produce locale-dependent output that varies by environment. The policy requires avoiding forced language/locale behavior unless the user can opt in or the constraint is clearly documented.
No suspicious patterns detected.