T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:36- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:36-44
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned dependencies from mutable package registries
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
r install.packages(c('plotly','shiny','bslib','DT','circlize','RColorBrewer','writexl'), type='binary') if (!require('BiocManager', quietly=TRUE)) install.packages('BiocManager', type='binary') BiocManager::install(c('DESeq2','edgeR','limma','WGCNA','Rsubread', 'ComplexHeatmap','clusterProfiler','enrichplot','AnnotationDbi','org.Ppasinensa.eg.db'), ask=FALSE)text pip install python-docx python-pptx matplotlib pandas openpyxlTechnical Analysis
The setup instructions install numerous R, Bioconductor, and Python packages without exact version constraints, integrity hashes, lockfiles, or explicitly constrained repositories. Package resolution therefore depends on mutable registry state at installation time, preventing reproducible verification of the reviewed dependency set.
This creates a supply-chain exposure if a registry, maintainer account, package release, dependency, or configured package mirror is compromised. It may also introduce incompatible or vulnerable future releases. The audit found no evidence that any named package is currently malicious; the issue is the unsafe dependency-resolution process.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises a relevant package, transitive dependency, maintainer account, registry, or package mirror.
- The attacker publishes or serves a malicious release that satisfies the unconstrained package request.
- A user or agent follows the documented installation commands.
- The package manager resolves and installs the attacker-controlled artifact because no approved version or cryptographic hash is enforced.
- Malicious installation hooks or runtime code execute under the account running R or
pip. - Because the skill declares Bash and Write permissions, execution in an ...[truncated 674 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin every direct dependency to an explicitly reviewed version.
- Generate and commit an R
renv.lockfile covering CRAN, Bioconductor, and transitive dependencies. - Use a hash-locked Python requirements file, such as:
text pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt - Configure explicit trusted CRAN, Bioconductor, and Python package indexes rather than inheriting arbitrary user or system mirrors.
- Download dependencies in a controlled build process, verify checksums or signatures where supported, and install from an approved internal artifact repository.
- Perform dependency vulnerability and provenance scanning before publishing updated lockfiles.
- Run installation and analysis under a dedicated, non-administrative account or isolated container with only the minimum required filesystem access.
- Separate dependency installation from normal skill execution and require user approval before package changes.
