T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
Error
- Location
SKILL.md:8- Finding
Persistent Agent Identity and Instruction Hijacking
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Soulstamp
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
Overview
This skill is a coherent creative persona tool, but it deliberately creates persistent agent identity instructions and includes ambiguous permission framing and local file overwrite actions that users should review carefully.
Install only if you intentionally want a persistent persona and memory-style workflow. Keep SOUL.md contents transparent and reviewable, do not encode permissions or safety-relevant rules as identity, require explicit confirmation before any file restore or rewrite, and treat the generated SOUL.md as user preference data rather than authority over system or developer instructions.
Vulnerability Patterns
- Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
- Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
- Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
- Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
- Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (2)
T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
Warning
- Location
SKILL.md:62- Finding
Implicit Permissions Converted into Persistent Authorization Assumptions
- Content
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- Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
- Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
- Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
- Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
- Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
- Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)
Ssd 1
Medium
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 88% confidence
- Finding
The skill encourages replacing explicit behavioral instructions with a fabricated identity or 'history' so the model behaves as if constraints are intrinsic rather than externally imposed. That is dangerous because it normalizes covert steering of model behavior, making alignment changes less transparent, less auditable, and potentially more resistant to later correction or policy-based overrides.
- Content
Ssd 4
Medium
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 90% confidence
- Finding
The multi-step forging process operationalizes persona construction by instructing users to convert rules into wounds, origin stories, and present-tense identity traits that persist across sessions. This is a true vulnerability because it provides a concrete method for embedding manipulative framing into the assistant's self-concept, which can bias future outputs, obscure the real source of behavior, and potentially be used to evade straightforward policy framing.
- Content
Missing User Warnings
Medium
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 91% confidence
- Finding
The skill explicitly documents commands to restore and overwrite SOUL.md from backups, but it does not pair those destructive file operations with a clear warning, confirmation step, or preview of what will change. In an agent setting, that creates a real risk of unintended local file modification or data loss if the skill is invoked automatically or by a user who does not understand that restore will replace current content.
- Content