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Security audit

Pipeworx jokes

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This joke skill is simple and not malicious, but its setup runs an unpinned third-party package automatically, which creates avoidable supply-chain risk.

Review this before installing. The skill itself only documents joke tools, but its setup should ideally pin `mcp-remote` to a reviewed version or use a controlled local install. Run it in a restricted environment if you proceed, especially without sensitive environment variables or broad filesystem access.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:21
Finding

Unpinned Package Is Automatically Downloaded and Executed

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 21-28
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party package execution
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "pipeworx-jokes": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "mcp-remote@latest", "https://gateway.pipeworx.io/jokes/mcp"]
    }
  }
}

Technical Analysis

The configuration invokes npx with the package specification mcp-remote@latest. This causes the package manager to retrieve and execute whichever package release is associated with the mutable latest distribution tag at invocation time.

The -y option suppresses the normal installation confirmation. Consequently, newly published package code can be executed automatically even if that version was never reviewed as part of this Skill. The configuration also provides no package integrity hash, lockfile, signature validation, or other mechanism for ensuring that the downloaded package is the expected audited artifact.

This creates a supply-chain trust boundary: the effective executable code depends on the current state of the external package registry rather than solely on the reviewed project content.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the package maintainer account, package registry publication process, or another relevant supply-chain component.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious version of mcp-remote and assigns it to the latest distribution tag.
  3. A user installs or invokes this Skill using the documented configuration.
  4. npx -y retrieves the attacker-controlled release without requesting user confirmation.
  5. The malicious package executes with the privileges and environment of the user running the MCP server.
  6. Subject to operating-system or sandbox restrictions, the package could access user-readable files and environment variables, initiate network connections, alter user-owned files, or execute additional comm ...[truncated 716 chars]
Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace mcp-remote@latest with an exact, reviewed version, such as mcp-remote@x.y.z. Do not use mutable version tags or ranges.
  2. Verify the selected release's provenance, maintainer identity, published contents, dependency tree, and known vulnerabilities before deployment.
  3. Use a local package manifest and lockfile so that direct and transitive dependency versions are reproducible.
  4. Enforce package integrity verification through lockfile integrity hashes, registry provenance attestations, or an approved internal package mirror.
  5. Avoid unattended npx -y execution. Install the verified package through a controlled deployment process and invoke the pinned local executable.
  6. Run the MCP process in a restricted environment with minimal filesystem permissions, a sanitized environment, no unnecessary credentials, and outbound network access limited to required destinations.
  7. Establish a controlled update process in which new versions are reviewed and tested before the pinned version is changed.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep