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Security audit

Pipeworx iplookup

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This IP lookup connector is mostly coherent, but its setup runs a mutable npm package automatically and routes lookup data through a Pipeworx gateway with limited data-handling disclosure.

Review this before installing. Prefer a pinned, reviewed mcp-remote version, and avoid submitting sensitive internal, customer, or investigation IPs unless Pipeworx's gateway handling and retention practices are acceptable to you.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (2)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:20
Finding

Unpinned Remote Package Retrieval and Execution

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 20–26
Vulnerability Type: T03: Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "pipeworx-iplookup": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "mcp-remote@latest", "https://gateway.pipeworx.io/iplookup/mcp"]
    }
  }
}

Technical Analysis

The configuration instructs the user to execute mcp-remote@latest through npx -y. The latest tag does not identify an immutable, reviewed version, while -y automatically accepts package installation. Consequently, code retrieved and executed in a future installation may differ from the code available when this Skill was audited.

This creates a remote code-execution supply-chain boundary: the effective local executable depends on mutable npm registry content and the security of the package publisher, registry, and distribution path. The audit found no evidence that the currently referenced package is malicious; the vulnerability is the automatic execution of mutable, externally supplied code without a version or integrity constraint.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the npm package, its publisher account, or another relevant distribution component.
  2. The attacker causes a malicious release to become the version resolved by mcp-remote@latest.
  3. A user applies the documented MCP configuration.
  4. npx -y retrieves the attacker-controlled release and runs its package entry point without interactive review.
  5. The malicious package executes with the operating-system permissions and environment access of the user running the MCP client.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could allow arbitrary local code execution under the invoking user's account. Depending on that account's existing permissions and environment, the payload could access readable files, environment variables, network resourc ...[truncated 275 chars]

Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  • Replace mcp-remote@latest with an exact, reviewed version.
  • Install the dependency through a lockfile-controlled project and verify the resolved package integrity hash.
  • Avoid automatic npx -y installation for security-sensitive deployment workflows.
  • Document the expected package publisher, package source, version, and integrity value so users can verify them before execution.
  • Review dependency updates before changing the pinned version, including package ownership, release differences, transitive dependencies, and published artifacts.
  • Where practical, vendor or reproducibly build the reviewed client and execute only the verified artifact.

other

Note
Location
SKILL.md:2
Finding

IP Lookup Data Is Disclosed to an Additional External Gateway

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 2–4 and 20–26
Vulnerability Type: other: External Data Disclosure
Risk Level: Low

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

yaml
name: pipeworx-iplookup
description: IP Lookup MCP — ip-api.com (free, no auth for basic usage)
version: 1.0.0
json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "pipeworx-iplookup": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "mcp-remote@latest", "https://gateway.pipeworx.io/iplookup/mcp"]
    }
  }
}

Technical Analysis

The Skill description emphasizes an IP lookup service backed by ip-api.com, but the supplied connection configuration directs MCP traffic to gateway.pipeworx.io. As a result, submitted lookup values and ordinary connection metadata are exposed to Pipeworx as an additional external intermediary.

The file does identify Pipeworx elsewhere and visibly includes its gateway URL, but it does not explain what query content the gateway receives, whether requests are forwarded, or how request data and metadata are retained. No evidence establishes misuse or unauthorized collection; the issue is the privacy and disclosure risk created by routing potentially sensitive lookup targets through an intermediary without an explicit data-handling statement.

Attack Path

  1. A user configures the remote MCP endpoint from SKILL.md.
  2. The user invokes geolocate_ip or batch_geolocate with one or more IP addresses.
  3. The MCP client transmits the request to gateway.pipeworx.io.
  4. The gateway can technically observe the submitted IP addresses and associated connection metadata.
  5. If those values represent internal infrastructure, investigation targets, or customer systems, the observed requests may reveal operationally sensitive information.

Impact Assessment

The primary impact is confidentiality loss affecting queried IP addresses and related network metadata. The exposed information may disclose ...[truncated 319 chars]

Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  • Explicitly state that lookup requests are sent to gateway.pipeworx.io and may subsequently use another lookup provider.
  • Document what request fields and connection metadata are processed, their retention period, permitted uses, and relevant privacy policy.
  • Warn users not to submit sensitive investigation targets or internal addresses unless the intermediary is approved for that data.
  • Obtain informed user or administrator approval before transmitting lookup data to the remote gateway.
  • Where technically possible, offer a direct connection to the stated lookup API to eliminate the additional intermediary.
  • Apply transport security, data minimization, access controls, retention limits, and logging restrictions at the gateway.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep