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Security audit

Pipeworx airquality

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s air-quality purpose is coherent, but its MCP setup tells users to auto-download and run an unpinned npm package, which is a material supply-chain risk.

Review this before installing through the MCP config. Direct `curl` calls to the documented gateway are narrow and no-auth, but the `npx -y mcp-remote@latest` setup should be pinned to a reviewed version or run only in a restricted environment with limited file, environment-variable, and credential access.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:44
Finding

Unpinned npm Dependency Automatically Downloads and Executes Mutable Remote Code

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 44-45
Vulnerability Type: T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

json
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "mcp-remote@latest", "https://gateway.pipeworx.io/airquality/mcp"]

Technical Analysis

The documented MCP configuration invokes npx with the -y option to automatically download and execute mcp-remote@latest. The latest npm tag is mutable, so the package version and effective executable code can change after this skill has been reviewed.

Because no exact version, lockfile, or package integrity hash is specified, users cannot reliably reproduce or verify the audited dependency. Automatic confirmation through -y further removes an opportunity to inspect the package before execution. This creates a supply-chain risk if the package, its publishing account, its dependencies, or the npm distribution channel is compromised.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the mcp-remote package, a transitive dependency, or an authorized npm publisher account.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious release and assigns it to the mutable latest tag.
  3. A user initializes the MCP server using the configuration in SKILL.md.
  4. npx -y retrieves the current package associated with mcp-remote@latest without interactive confirmation.
  5. The downloaded package executes locally with the permissions and environment of the user running the MCP client.
  6. The malicious package can access resources available to that process and perform unauthorized actions within those privileges.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution with the MCP client's user privileges. Depending on the execution environment, exposed resources could include readable local files, environment variables, application credentials, network-accessible services, and other agent-accessible resources.

The precise scope is limited by the operating-sys ...[truncated 313 chars]

Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace mcp-remote@latest with an exact, reviewed version such as mcp-remote@X.Y.Z.
  2. Install the dependency during a controlled deployment step rather than downloading and executing it dynamically whenever the MCP server starts.
  3. Use a lockfile and npm integrity metadata to make dependency resolution reproducible and detect package tampering.
  4. Remove automatic approval through npx -y, or configure the environment so only preinstalled and explicitly approved packages can run.
  5. Mirror approved packages in a controlled registry and enforce registry allowlisting where feasible.
  6. Audit the package and its transitive dependencies before upgrades, and use automated dependency monitoring for publisher changes, malicious releases, and known vulnerabilities.
  7. Run the MCP client under a dedicated, least-privileged account or sandbox with restricted filesystem, environment-variable, credential, and network access.
  8. Establish an explicit update process requiring security review before changing the pinned dependency version.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 9)May include surrounding context.

md
openclaw:
    requires:
      bins:
        - curl
    emoji: "⚡"
    homepage: https://pipeworx.io/packs/airquality
---