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Security audit

Superclaw

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a disclosed development workflow tool, but it broadly takes control of coding sessions, reads private agent context, spawns subagents, and writes persistent logs by default.

Install only if you explicitly want a strict, opinionated workflow that can delay direct coding, read agent memory/profile files for context, create planning documents, spawn subagents, and write progress logs. Prefer a pinned, reviewed installer version and consider narrowing activation and memory access before using it in workspaces with sensitive context.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
brainstorming/SKILL.md:10
Finding

Mandatory Workflow Instructions Override Explicit User Direction

Content
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"I understand you want to move quickly. A 2-minute design will save hours of rework. Let me ask 2 quick questions, propose an approach, and get your thumbs-up. Total time: 3 minutes. Deal?" ``` From `brainstorming/SKILL.md:273-277`: ```markdown **When you catch yourself failing:** Stop immediately. Delete any code. Return to the process. ``` From `executing-plans/SKILL.md:13-19`: ```markdown ## ⛔ HARD GATES 1. **DO NOT execute more than 5 tasks without a checkpoint** 2. **DO NOT skip progress updates to memory logs** 3. **DO NOT execute tasks all at once, even if user says "no interruptions"** 4. **DO NOT rationalize away batching for "efficiency"** Checkpoints are safety mechanisms, not annoyances. They catch errors early before they compound. ``` From `executing-plans/SKILL.md:109-120`: ```markdown **If user says "just do it all, no interruptions":** - **DO NOT skip checkpoints** - Response: "Checkpoints aren't interruptions - they catch errors early. I'll notify you after each batch so you can review progress or let me continue." **Auto-continue option:** If user says "auto-continue if no errors": - Still show batch results - Only pause if errors/warnings detected - User can interrupt at any checkpoint ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill text establishe ...[truncated 2244 chars]
Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
brainstorming/SKILL.md:22
Finding

Routine Development Tasks Trigger Broad Access to Private Agent Context

Content
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Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:88
Finding

Installation Command Executes a Mutable Unpinned npm Package

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (12)

Memory Manipulation

High
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · executing-plans/SKILL.md (reported line 74)May include surrounding context.

sessions_spawn --label "task-N-" --prompt "Execute task N from plan..."

text

2. **Provide clear context:**
- Task number and description
- Exact file paths to create/modify
- Expected outcome

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The statement that skills will 'auto-load when relevant tasks are detected' defines activation in vague, open-ended terms with no explicit boundaries, approval step, or matching criteria. In a workflow skill that can steer planning and execution behavior across development tasks, this ambiguity can cause unintended invocation on loosely related prompts, expanding the skill's control surface and making prompt-trigger abuse or accidental workflow hijacking more likely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The README states that skills 'auto-load when relevant tasks are detected' without defining clear scope, precedence, or safety boundaries for what counts as relevant. In an agentic development workflow, overly broad auto-invocation can cause the skill to activate on ordinary coding requests, steering behavior unexpectedly and increasing the chance that chained sub-skills run without sufficiently explicit user consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The brainstorming trigger is described broadly as applying when 'creating features, building components, adding functionality,' which overlaps with many normal software requests. Because this skill enforces a hard gate before coding and chains into additional skills, a vague trigger can overreach, hijack routine interactions, and create unintended control over the agent's behavior across a wide range of prompts.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger text for phase 1 is broad enough to match many normal development requests such as creating features or adding functionality. Overly broad activation can cause the skill to auto-engage in situations the user did not intend, which is risky here because the skill then chains into other skills and alters workflow behavior automatically.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The installation command uses npx clawhub@latest, which fetches and executes the latest package version at runtime instead of a pinned, reviewed release. In an agent skill ecosystem, this creates a supply-chain risk: a compromised publisher account, malicious update, or unexpected breaking change could cause arbitrary code execution during installation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The statement that skills 'auto-load when relevant tasks are detected' is vague because 'relevant tasks' is undefined, leaving activation behavior open to broad interpretation by the host agent. In this skill, that ambiguity is more dangerous because the package enforces automatic chaining across multiple phases, which could trigger unintended file writes, memory updates, and subagent spawning.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The trigger description is intentionally broad and overlaps with a large share of normal software-development requests, making this skill likely to activate in many situations. Because the skill imposes a hard gate and directs the agent to inspect local context files and control workflow progression, over-triggering can cause denial-of-service-like disruption, unnecessary access to contextual data, and unintended interception of tasks better handled by other skills.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · executing-plans/SKILL.md (reported line 200)May include surrounding context.

md
sessions_spawn --label "task-3-storage-layer" --prompt "
Execute task 3 from /workspace/docs/plans/2026-02-25-todo-plan.md:

Create /workspace/todo/lib/storage.js with:
- loadTodos() function
- saveTodos() function
- Use fs.readFileSync/writeFileSync

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The listed activation examples include generic phrases like "start building," "go ahead," and "make it happen," which are common in everyday project conversations and could cause the skill to activate too broadly. Although the file includes some negative conditions, it does not narrowly constrain these phrases to a specific command context or provide exclusions for nearby but non-triggering cases.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · writing-plans/SKILL.md (reported line 36)May include surrounding context.

md
Before writing the plan, discuss approach with the user:

**Questions to ask:**
- "Should we use TDD (test-driven development)? Write tests first, then make them pass?"
- "How often should I commit? After each task, or batch them?"
- "Any specific tools, libraries, or patterns you want me to use?"
- "Should I create feature branches or work on main?"

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The skill directs the agent to save a plan file into the workspace, which is a real state-changing action, but it does not explicitly require user confirmation or a user-facing notice before modifying files. In isolation this is low impact because it creates documentation rather than executing code, but it can still cause unexpected workspace mutations or normalize silent file writes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.