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Security audit

Repo Onboarding

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill has a coherent repo-onboarding purpose, but it asks agents to run unreviewed local scripts and optionally install a persistent daily cron task without enough user control or disclosure.

Review this carefully before installing. Only run the setup scripts if you trust the exact local files at the referenced paths, understand what repository files they will change, and explicitly want a cron job that keeps running later. Prefer a version that bundles reviewed package-relative scripts, shows proposed changes, and documents how to remove any scheduled task.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • System PersistenceInstalls backdoors, hooks, services, or scheduled tasks that survive the run
  • Tool Hijacking and SpoofingModifies or replaces tools so legitimate-looking calls execute attacker logic
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T06 · System Persistence

Error
Location
SKILL.md:45
Finding

Optional Installation of a Persistent Scheduled Task

Content
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Remediation
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T07 · Tool Hijacking and Spoofing

Error
Location
SKILL.md:22
Finding

Execution of Unverified Scripts Outside the Audited Skill Package

Content
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docs/pm/architecture-assessment.json # 2) dependency analysis python /home/broedkrummen/.openclaw/workspace-cody/skills/senior-architect/scripts/dependency_analyzer.py . --output json > docs/pm/dependency-analysis.json # 3) architecture diagram (mermaid) python /home/broedkrummen/.openclaw/workspace-cody/skills/senior-architect/scripts/architecture_diagram_generator.py . --format mermaid -o docs/pm/architecture-diagram.md ``` ```bash bash /home/broedkrummen/.openclaw/workspace-cody/skills/repo-kanban-pm/scripts/init_repo_pm.sh "$(pwd)" ``` ```bash bash /home/broedkrummen/.openclaw/workspace-cody/skills/repo-kanban-pm/scripts/add_daily_pm_cron.sh "$(pwd)" --agent cody --tz UTC --time 09:30 ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill delegates repository inspection, repository modification, and scheduled-task installation to Python and shell scripts located outside the audited package. These files were not present in the supplied project, so their contents and security properties could not be reviewed. The paths are absolute and user-specific but are not integrity-pinned. Replacing or modifying a referenced file changes the effective behavior of the Skill without requiring any update to `SKILL.md`. Invoking the files through Python or Bash grants them ordinary code-execution capabilities under the invoking user's identity. This creates a local trust-boundary weakness: legitimate-looking onboarding commands can execute substituted or compromised logic from mutable external locations. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker, compromised process, or untrusted installation obtains write access to one of the referenced exter ...[truncated 1398 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to execute local shell scripts that modify the repository and optionally install a cron job, but it does not clearly warn the user that these are system-impacting operations. This is dangerous because onboarding appears routine and low-risk, yet it can persist changes outside normal repo edits, including scheduled execution on the host, which expands the blast radius if the scripts are unsafe or tampered with.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.