T06 · System Persistence
Error
- Location
SKILL.md:21- Finding
Persistent System-Wide Services for Dashboard and Network Exposure
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
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Security audit
Overkill Mission Control
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
Overview
This skill is a disclosed mission-control dashboard, but it asks to install persistent system services and remotely expose an agent-control interface with root-level service configuration and little security scoping.
Review carefully before installing. Only use this on a machine where you are comfortable running a persistent OpenClaw control dashboard, and do not enable Tailscale exposure until access controls, allowed users, authentication, logs, and uninstall/disable steps are clear. The localhost curl examples are not exfiltration evidence, but the persistent root-level proxy service and autonomous execution endpoints deserve administrator review.
Vulnerability Patterns
- Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
- System PersistenceInstalls backdoors, hooks, services, or scheduled tasks that survive the run
- Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
- Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
- Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)
T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
Error
- Location
SKILL.md:143- Finding
Tailscale Proxy Service Executes with Unnecessary Root Privileges
- Content
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- Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
- Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
- Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
- Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
- Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
- Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (8)
Session Persistence
Medium
- Category
- Rogue Agent
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
- Content
md { "id": "service", "kind": "systemd", "label": "Create Mission Control systemd service", "path": "/etc/systemd/system/mission-control.service" }, {
Missing User Warnings
Medium
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 90% confidence
- Finding
The documentation encourages exposing the dashboard via Tailscale and advertises webhook/HTTP automation, but provides no warning about authentication, sensitive data exposure, or the risk of remote triggering. Because this dashboard appears to control agents, messages, documents, and automation, remote exposure without explicit security guidance can lead users to deploy an internet-reachable control plane unsafely.
- Content
Missing User Warnings
Medium
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 94% confidence
- Finding
The skill describes polling and execution endpoints that can trigger autonomous operations, including executing tasks based on message content, but does not warn that these actions may cause real side effects. In a mission-control product, undocumented autonomous execution is especially dangerous because users may invoke endpoints or enable polling without understanding they can drive agents to act on external or queued input.
- Content
Context-Inappropriate Capability
Medium
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 92% confidence
- Finding
The skill instructs creation of a root-level Tailscale proxy service for a dashboard, which expands exposure beyond the stated local dashboard function and grants network publication capability under root. In the context of a mission-control interface with agent messaging, task execution, documents, and webhooks, externally exposing the service materially increases attack surface and the blast radius of any app flaw or misconfiguration.
- Content
Sudo/Root Execution
Medium
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Confidence
- 97% confidence
- Finding
The service is configured to run as root and invokes sudo in ExecStart to publish the dashboard via Tailscale. Running a network-exposed helper as root violates least-privilege principles and increases the consequences of command misuse, service compromise, or future modifications to the service definition.
- Content
md [Service] Type=simple User=root ExecStart=/usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/tailscale serve 3000 Restart=always [Install]
External Transmission
Medium
- Category
- Data Exfiltration
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
- Content
Dashboard not loading
bash # Check if server is running curl http://localhost:3000 # Restart server sudo systemctl restart mission-control
Sudo/Root Execution
Medium
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Confidence
- 70% confidence
- Finding
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
- Content
Restart server
sudo systemctl restart mission-control
text ### Tailscale not working
Sudo/Root Execution
Medium
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Confidence
- 70% confidence
- Finding
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
- Content
Restart server
sudo systemctl restart mission-control
text ### Tailscale not working