T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
Remote Installer Is Downloaded and Executed Without Verification
SKILL.md:18Vulnerability Details
File Location: SKILL.md, line 18
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: High
Vulnerable Code:
curl -fsSL https://rem.sidv.dev/install | bash
Technical Analysis
The recommended installation command streams a response from an external domain directly into Bash. The retrieved script is not included in the audited project and is not pinned to an immutable version, inspected before execution, or authenticated through a cryptographic signature or documented checksum.
HTTPS protects the connection under normal conditions, but it does not establish that every future response from the server is safe. The effective payload can change after the Skill has been reviewed. Compromise of the hosting account, domain, server, certificate issuance process, or deployment pipeline could therefore turn this command into an arbitrary-code execution channel.
Directly executing mutable network content is unnecessary for the declared reminder-management functionality and exceeds the minimum privileges needed to distribute a CLI. Users can instead download and verify a versioned artifact before running or installing it.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises or gains control over
rem.sidv.dev, its deployment pipeline, or the hosted installer. - The attacker replaces the installer response with a malicious shell script.
- A user or agent follows the documented installation command.
curlretrieves the attacker-controlled response and pipes it directly to Bash without local review or integrity verification.- Bash executes the payload with all permissions available to the invoking user.
- The payload can access user-readable data, modify user-writable files, install persistence within the user's account, or download and execute additional components.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation provides arbitrary command execution with t ...[truncated 665 chars]
Remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the
curl | bashinstallation pattern. - Publish versioned, immutable release artifacts through a trusted release channel.
- Document a two-step installation process that downloads the artifact before any execution occurs.
- Publish a SHA-256 checksum through a separately protected channel and require users to verify it before installation.
- Prefer cryptographic release signatures with documented key verification and rotation procedures.
- Pin documentation to a specific reviewed release rather than a mutable installer endpoint.
- Ensure the installer never requests elevated privileges unless a clearly identified operation strictly requires them.
- Provide the installer source in the audited repository so its filesystem changes, network behavior, and privilege requirements can be reviewed.
