T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
README.md:108- Finding
Administrative API Authentication Tokens Transmitted Over Plaintext HTTP
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a documentation-only 1Panel server-management skill, but it guides agents through broad administrative and secret-handling operations with weak safety and transport guidance.
Install only if you intend to let the agent help operate a trusted 1Panel server. Use HTTPS/WSS only, treat the 1Panel API key and all generated tokens as administrator credentials, avoid pasting production secrets unless necessary, and require explicit confirmation before destructive or host-level actions such as deleting files/databases, changing SSH/firewall/Docker/Nginx config, partitioning disks, running scripts, or creating persistent services.
README.md:108Administrative API Authentication Tokens Transmitted Over Plaintext HTTP
docs/SKILL-process.md:225Process Monitoring and Termination Examples Use Unencrypted and Incompletely Authenticated Connections
This section documents submission of highly sensitive values such as API keys and agent tokens with no guidance on secure handling, storage, masking, or transport requirements. In an agent-skill context, normalizing raw secret collection increases the chance that downstream tools, logs, prompts, or operators will expose credentials, leading to account takeover or abuse of third-party AI services.
These endpoints ingest API keys, app secrets, and bot tokens for external providers and messaging platforms, yet the documentation provides no safeguards for secret lifecycle management. Because this skill targets agent and integration setup, the absence of secure-handling guidance materially raises the likelihood of credential leakage through logs, prompts, screenshots, backups, or improperly protected storage.
The skill documents an endpoint that accepts raw email credentials, including a password, for configuration testing, yet provides no warning about secret handling, transport security, or logging exposure. In an agent-skill context, this is riskier because operators may paste production credentials into tools that could log requests, display them in traces, or send them over insecure HTTP as shown in the base URL example.
This endpoint documents deleting scan rules and includes a 'removeInfected' option that may delete infected files, a destructive and potentially irreversible action affecting user data. No warning is provided about file deletion consequences or the need for confirmation.
Replacing the complete Fail2ban configuration is a high-impact operation that can break the service, weaken protections, or cause administrative lockout if invalid. The markdown does not include any explicit caution about backup, validation, or rollback.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
return path.Join(i.GetAppPath(), i.Name, "docker-compose.yml")
}
// 获取 .env 文件路径
func (i *AppInstall) GetEnvPath() string {
return path.Join(i.GetAppPath(), i.Name, ".env")
}
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
return path.Join(i.GetAppPath(), i.Name, "docker-compose.yml")
}
// 获取 .env 文件路径
func (i *AppInstall) GetEnvPath() string {
return path.Join(i.GetAppPath(), i.Name, ".env")
}
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
// 获取 .env 文件路径 func (i *AppInstall) GetEnvPath() string { return path.Join(i.GetAppPath(), i.Name, ".env") }
The /files/mount endpoint exposes system-level mount functionality inside a file-management skill, which is substantially more privileged than ordinary file browsing or editing. Mount operations can alter visibility of devices and filesystems, expose sensitive host data, or be abused to access or modify resources outside the expected file-management scope.
The documented disk partition endpoint performs an inherently destructive operation that can erase data, break filesystems, or render a host unbootable, yet the skill provides no warning or guardrail language. In an agent workflow, omission of irreversible-impact warnings makes accidental invocation substantially more likely and more dangerous.
Firewall rule changes and firewall start/stop/rebind operations can immediately sever connectivity, expose services, or lock administrators out of the host. Because the skill omits warnings about network disruption and remote-access loss, an agent or operator may apply dangerous rule changes without understanding the blast radius.
These SSH secret endpoints explicitly handle private keys and passphrases, and the search response even includes passPhrase, publicKey, and privateKey fields. Exposing sensitive credential material in a broadly consumable skill without strong warnings or minimization guidance creates serious risk of credential theft, lateral movement, and unauthorized host access.
Deleting SSH secrets can permanently remove credentials required for automation or emergency access, potentially causing outages or administrative lockout. The absence of any warning about irreversibility or dependency impact makes accidental destructive use more plausible.
The SSH configuration and service-management endpoints can weaken authentication, enable root login, change listen addresses/ports, or restart/stop SSH entirely, all of which can either reduce host security or cut off remote administration. Without warnings and guardrails, these are highly dangerous capabilities to expose through an agent-oriented skill.
The tool and Supervisor endpoints can edit service configs, start/stop services, and define process commands and environments, effectively enabling arbitrary command execution under service-managed contexts. Documenting these privileged controls without warnings about disruption and code-execution risk makes the skill especially dangerous in an automated agent environment.
This endpoint allows raw replacement of the website Nginx configuration file via an arbitrary content field, which is significantly more dangerous than scoped parameter updates. Without warnings or safeguards, an agent could introduce invalid config, disable protections, expose files, or proxy traffic unsafely, causing outage or security compromise.
The documented API includes parameters to execute arbitrary custom shell content (execShell and shell) during certificate operations. In the context of a panel/API skill for infrastructure management, exposing shell execution is highly dangerous because it can enable remote command execution, persistence, or full host compromise if callers can supply or influence these fields.
The API explicitly supports executing arbitrary custom shell script content through the SSL management workflow via execShell and shell. In an admin-facing panel this creates a direct command-execution capability that can be abused for remote code execution if the endpoint is exposed to untrusted users, invoked by an agent, or insufficiently permission-gated.
The markdown describes uploading raw private key material and later shows privateKey in the response schema, but it provides no warning that these fields contain highly sensitive secrets. Documentation should clearly disclose the sensitivity of private keys and caution users about storage, transmission, and logging risks.
The documented normal SSL detail response includes raw privateKey material, meaning any caller able to fetch certificate details can obtain the secret key. Exposure of private keys fully compromises TLS identity, enabling impersonation, traffic interception, and long-term credential theft until the certificate is revoked and replaced.
The response example publishes raw private key material in normal API output and omits any warning that the endpoint may return credential secrets. In this skill context, documentation is actionable for agents and operators, so demonstrating secret-bearing responses increases the chance of unsafe integration, logging, or automated exfiltration of key material.
This markdown file instructs users to configure a panel address and API key, and later shows authenticated API usage including creating websites, but it does not warn that the API key is sensitive or that authenticated calls can modify server configuration and data. For a server-management skill covering backups, files, databases, scripts, and websites, the description should disclose privacy and system-integrity implications before use.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# 获取容器列表
curl -X GET "http://192.168.1.100:8888/api/v2/containers/list" \
-H "1Panel-Token: your_token" \
-H "1Panel-Timestamp: 1709548800" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json"
The skill asks the user to provide a 1Panel API key for broad server-management operations but does not warn that this credential is highly sensitive or that misuse can affect websites, containers, databases, files, backups, and system settings. In an agent context, collecting such a credential without explicit scoping, least-privilege guidance, storage/handling warnings, or confirmation for destructive actions increases the risk of credential exposure and unauthorized administrative changes.
The manifest describes this skill as providing API interface documentation for 1Panel modules, but this file documents endpoints that create, update, start, stop, and delete runtime resources such as MCP servers, TensorRT containers, Ollama models, and Agents. Those are active administrative and orchestration operations, not merely passive documentation or limited read-oriented lookup behavior.