Security audit

Secrets Management

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent secrets-management guide, but several copyable examples use unsafe secret-handling and mutable dependencies in high-impact CI/CD contexts.

Review and harden the examples before installing or using this skill. Treat the Vault dev server, root token, and literal passwords as local-only placeholders; do not copy them into shared, CI, staging, or production environments. Pin GitHub Actions and container images to reviewed immutable SHAs or digests, prefer short-lived identity-based credentials, and avoid passing real secrets directly on command lines.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review

Findings (4)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

Location: SKILL.md:40
Finding: Insecure Vault development configuration and hardcoded root token
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

Location: SKILL.md:104
Finding: Secret passed as a literal command-line argument
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

Location: SKILL.md:66
Finding: GitHub Actions are referenced through mutable version tags
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

Location: SKILL.md:88
Finding: Security tooling containers use mutable latest tags
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (3)

Credential Access

High

Category: Privilege Escalation
Confidence: 60% confidence
Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Content: Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 17)May include surrounding context.
md
- Deploying to Kubernetes with external secrets DON'T USE WHEN: - Only need local dev values (use .env files not in git) - Cannot secure access to the secrets backend - Planning to hardcode secrets (don't do that)

Rp1

Medium

Category: MCP Rug Pull
Confidence: 75% confidence
Finding: Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tool Parameter Abuse

Low

Category: Tool Misuse
Confidence: 15% confidence
Finding: Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
Content: Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 251)May include surrounding context.
md
# .git/hooks/pre-commit # Check for secrets with TruffleHog docker run --rm -v "$(pwd):/repo" \ trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest \ filesystem --directory=/repo

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.