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Security audit

Keepa Api

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears to be a legitimate Keepa API client, but it handles your API key in ways that can expose it, so it should be reviewed before installing.

Install only if you are comfortable sending your Keepa API key and product queries to Keepa. Prefer using an environment variable over a project CONFIG.md file, keep any config file out of repositories and backups, restrict its permissions, avoid running examples with real keys in logged terminals or CI output, and rotate the key if it may have been exposed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/keepa.sh:122
Finding

Keepa API Key Exposed in Process Arguments and URL Logging

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/keepa.sh:246
Finding

Improper URL Encoding Allows Keepa API Parameter Injection

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (20)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 204)May include surrounding context.

md
1. **Keepa API Key** (required):
   - Input your Keepa API key
   - Get key from: https://keepa.com/#!api

2. **Default marketplace**:
   - US (amazon.com)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/keepa.sh (reported line 114)May include surrounding context.

sh
if [[ -z "$KEEPA_API_KEY" ]]; then
        print_error "Keepa API key is not configured!"
        echo ""
        echo "Get API key from: https://keepa.com/#!api"
        echo "Then: export KEEPA_API_KEY=your_key"
        echo "Or create: ~/.teamclaw-skills/keepa-api/CONFIG.md"
        exit 1

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill clearly instructs use of shell capabilities (test, curl, package installation commands) but does not declare any explicit tool scope such as allowed tools or permissions. This weakens least-privilege controls and can cause the agent to execute shell actions users or platform policy did not expect.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill description and operational guidance are written in Chinese, with no indication that users may choose another language or that the locale is intentionally limited. Under the language/locale policy, a skill should not implicitly force a specific language without user opt-in or clear justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill asks the user for a Keepa API key and specifies storing it in local CONFIG.md files, but does not clearly warn that the credential will be persisted on disk. Users may disclose a secret without understanding its storage location, retention, or exposure risk to other local processes, repositories, or backups.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill transmits user-supplied and secret data, including the API key and queried product identifiers, to an external service via curl. External transmission is expected for an API client, but it still creates data exposure risk and should be explicitly scoped and disclosed, especially because the request is performed through a generic shell command.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 254)May include surrounding context.

Execute curl request:

bash
curl -s "https://api.keepa.com/product?key=$API_KEY&domain=$DOMAIN&asin=$ASIN"

Step 4: Parse and Display Results

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The documentation instructs users to place the API key in the URL query string without warning that query parameters are commonly exposed in browser history, reverse-proxy logs, analytics, crash reports, and shared shell history. Although this mirrors the vendor API design, publishing examples this way without any credential-handling warning increases the chance of accidental secret disclosure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

This reference points to an external third-party API endpoint and the surrounding example includes credential transmission to that external service. In this skill context, external transmission is expected, but it is still security-relevant because users may unknowingly send sensitive API keys off-platform and expose them through URL-based authentication.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-docs.md (reported line 8)May include surrounding context.

Keepa API 使用 API Key 进行认证,所有请求都需要在 URL 参数中包含 key 参数。

text
https://api.keepa.com/product?key=YOUR_API_KEY&domain=1&asin=B08XYZ123

获取 API Key

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The cURL examples send requests to a third-party service while embedding the API key directly in the command line, which can leak via shell history, process listings, CI logs, and terminal recordings. The issue is amplified because the examples normalize operational use of real credentials without warning users about exposure paths.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The cURL example makes an outbound request to Keepa and includes the API key in the URL, causing both external transmission and potential local credential exposure. In an API client skill this behavior is functionally necessary, but the lack of disclosure and safe-usage guidance makes it a real security concern rather than a mere false positive.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-docs.md (reported line 209)May include surrounding context.

查询单个 ASIN

bash
curl -s "https://api.keepa.com/product?key=YOUR_API_KEY&domain=1&asin=B08XYZ123&history=1"

批量查询 ASIN

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This example performs external transmission to Keepa while embedding an API key in a URL, creating the same risk of disclosure through shell history, logs, and monitoring tools. The batch-query context may also increase operational exposure because users are likely to automate these commands in scripts or CI pipelines where command logging is common.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-docs.md (reported line 215)May include surrounding context.

批量查询 ASIN

bash
curl -s "https://api.keepa.com/product?key=YOUR_API_KEY&domain=1&asin=B08XYZ123,B09ABC456,B07DEF789"

搜索产品

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The search example transmits credentials to an external service and normalizes placing the secret in a URL. While contacting Keepa is expected for this skill, the documentation omits security context about where the key goes and how it can be captured by local or intermediary logging systems.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-docs.md (reported line 221)May include surrounding context.

搜索产品

bash
curl -s "https://api.keepa.com/search?key=YOUR_API_KEY&domain=1&query=wireless+earbuds"

获取热销榜

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This best-sellers example also sends an API key to a third-party endpoint via the URL, which is expected behavior for the integration but still security-significant. The danger comes less from maliciousness and more from absent warnings, making accidental credential leakage more likely in user workflows.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-docs.md (reported line 227)May include surrounding context.

获取热销榜

bash
curl -s "https://api.keepa.com/bestsellers?key=YOUR_API_KEY&domain=1&categoryId=172282"

错误处理

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The help output advertises batch-asin <ASINs> as a multi-ASIN query command. But in the dispatcher, L384-L386 explicitly state # For batch, just query first ASIN for now and pass only the first comma-separated ASIN to cmd_asin. This directly contradicts the documented behavior of the command.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/keepa.sh (reported line 84)May include surrounding context.

sh
./keepa.sh search "wireless earbuds" --category Electronics

Configuration:
  Export KEEPA_API_KEY or create ~/.teamclaw-skills/keepa-api/CONFIG.md

Get API Key: https://keepa.com/#!api
EOF

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/keepa.sh (reported line 125)May include surrounding context.

sh
keepa_request() {
    local endpoint="$1"
    local params="$2"
    local url="https://api.keepa.com/${endpoint}?key=${KEEPA_API_KEY}${params}"
    curl -s --compressed "$url"
}

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The API key is embedded in the request URL, which can leak through shell history, process listings in some environments, logs, proxies, monitoring systems, or error reporting. Even over HTTPS, URL-based secrets are more likely to be recorded by infrastructure than headers or request bodies.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The natural-language comments and title in this template are written entirely in Chinese, which imposes a specific language on users without any opt-in or alternative. The policy for this category allows locale constraints only when justified or optional, neither of which is stated here.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

文件整体以中文编写,标题也明确为“参考文档”,但未说明这是可选本地化版本或提供语言选择。按照该规则,若技能内容强制单一语言且无用户选择或明确合理化说明,可视为自然语言策略问题。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding

At L084, the documentation tells users to create ~/.teamclaw-skills/keepa-api/CONFIG.md. However, load_config first checks .teamclaw-skills/keepa-api/CONFIG.md relative to the current directory, and only then checks the home-directory path. This is a documentation-to-code mismatch about where configuration is actually loaded from.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.