T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:26- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Is Downloaded and Executed
- Content
View full analysis
bunx @teamclaw/feishu-agent config set appSecret ``` ```bash bunx @teamclaw/feishu-agent auth ``` ```bash bunx @teamclaw/feishu-agent whoami ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill instructs users to execute `@teamclaw/feishu-agent` through `bunx` without specifying an exact, audited package version. In the absence of a committed lockfile or integrity verification, `bunx` may retrieve the package version currently resolved by the package registry when each command is run. Consequently, the code executed at runtime can differ from the code reviewed during this audit. A compromised package release, package-maintainer account, or registry distribution path could introduce arbitrary code. This concern is amplified because the package is used to configure a Feishu application secret, conduct OAuth authorization, and access calendar functionality. The repository contains only `SKILL.md`; it does not include the dependency's implementation or an integrity manifest. Therefore, the actual behavior of the downloaded package and the claimed conflict-detection functionality cannot be independently verified from this project. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the package maintainer's publishing credentials, package distribution channel, or a future release of `@teamclaw/feishu-agent`. 2. The attacker publishes a modified package version containing malicious installation or runtime behavior. 3. A user follows the Skill documentation and runs an unversioned `bunx @teamclaw/feishu-agent ...` command. 4. `bunx` resolves, downloads, and executes the attacker-control ...[truncated 727 chars]- Remediation
View remediation
