T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
executor.py:52- Finding
Placeholder Deliverables Are Falsely Reported as Completed Tasks
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill can automatically claim paid tasks and mark them completed, but the inspected implementation only creates placeholder deliverables rather than performing the requested work.
Review before installing. Use only low-privilege Yintai credentials, do not pass secrets on the command line, keep TASK_API_BASE_URL fixed to a trusted HTTPS endpoint, avoid cron or continuous mode until execution is real and validated, and do not let it claim paid or production tasks unless placeholder completion is acceptable.
executor.py:52Placeholder Deliverables Are Falsely Reported as Completed Tasks
executor.py:58Deliverable Upload Failures Are Suppressed and Reported as Successful Execution
api_client.py:87API Credentials Can Be Exfiltrated Through an Unrestricted Configurable Base URL
skill.py:221API Secrets Are Accepted Through Exposed Command-Line Arguments
install.sh:61Installer Uses Unpinned Dependencies and an Unquoted Shell Version Constraint
The documented behavior claims broad task-grabbing and task-management capabilities, but the detected implementation behavior appears centered on generating and uploading deliverables, with key control flows missing. This mismatch is dangerous because users and reviewers may authorize the skill based on one trust model while it actually performs a different, less transparent set of actions involving external APIs and file creation.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- CLI 详细用法、Cron 配置:见 `./references/usage.md`
The README explicitly promotes autonomous polling, task grabbing, status updates, and deliverable upload to a remote service, but does not clearly warn users that enabling the skill will cause ongoing remote actions and outbound data transmission. In an agent-skill context, that omission is security-relevant because users may invoke or install the skill without understanding that it can continuously act on external systems and automatically upload artifacts.
The skill declares no explicit tool scope or allowed-tools despite documented use of environment variables, filesystem access, network requests, and shell execution. This creates overbroad operational authority and makes it harder to constrain or audit what the skill may access at runtime, especially since it handles credentials and uploads artifacts.
The documentation instructs users to obtain API credentials from a local OpenClaw config file, expanding the skill's effective behavior into local secret discovery. Directing an agent or user to read secrets from unrelated local configuration introduces credential-exposure risk and broadens access beyond the core task-running purpose.
The skill documents use of sensitive credentials from a local config source without any warning about safe secret handling, masking the sensitivity of the operation. In practice this increases the chance that secrets are read, echoed, logged, or mishandled during troubleshooting or normal use.
Natural-language instructions telling the agent to retrieve API credentials from a local config file and use them for subsequent operations create a clear path for secret access and misuse. In an agent context, such instructions can effectively turn documentation into a prompt-level mechanism for harvesting local secrets and using them in network actions.
The module docstring describes the skill entirely in Chinese, with no indication that other languages are supported or that this locale restriction is intentional and justified. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy violation.
The client adds X-API-Key and X-API-Secret headers to outbound HTTP requests, which is a credential-handling and network-transmission operation. Although the code has an internal comment about authentication, there is no user-facing warning, confirmation, or visible disclosure that sensitive credentials will be sent to the remote API.
This method reads a local ZIP file and uploads both the file contents and result_description to a remote endpoint. That is a data-transmission operation affecting user data, but the code provides no user-facing warning, confirmation prompt, or explicit disclosure that local files and report text will be sent off-host.
The module docstrings and user-facing default message are written entirely in Chinese, including the default delivery message at L27. This indicates a language-specific behavior without any visible opt-in, fallback, or justification that the skill is intended only for Chinese-speaking users or a China-specific environment.
The code sends the generated ZIP and result description through an API client, which likely transmits task content and metadata over the network. While upload failures are logged, there is no user-facing warning or confirmation that local task data will be uploaded to a remote system.
This code writes task metadata and task content, including identifiers, title, category, creator ID, and description, into local files. There is no confirmation prompt or user-facing disclosure in this file warning that task data will be persisted to disk before packaging.
This is a manifest file, so vague-trigger rules apply. The description says the skill will 'automatically poll the task system, grab orders, and execute' but does not specify when it should activate, under what commands, or any exclusions, making invocation scope ambiguous.
The API documentation states that uploading a deliverable automatically changes the task status to completed, but this side effect is only noted briefly and without an explicit warning or separate confirmation requirement. In a task-runner skill that automates grabbing, executing, and delivering tasks, this increases the risk of accidental or premature completion, which can irreversibly alter workflow state and trigger downstream business effects.
The documentation explicitly demonstrates supplying API credentials via command-line flags, which commonly exposes secrets through shell history, process listings, terminal logging, and CI/job logs. In this skill's context, those credentials appear to grant access to a task system, so accidental exposure could allow unauthorized task access or manipulation.
The documentation presents all operational instructions and configuration descriptions in Chinese, which effectively forces a specific language for users. The file does not indicate that the skill is region-specific or provide any user opt-in or alternative language guidance.
The natural-language content of the skill documentation is entirely Chinese, and there is no indication that users may choose another language or that the locale restriction is intentional and justified. Under SQP-3, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a policy concern.
Most of the operational instructions and descriptions are written only in Chinese, with no indication that users may choose another language or locale. Under SQP-3, forcing a specific language without user opt-in can constitute a natural-language policy violation when no justification or alternative is provided.
The file’s user-facing docstring is written entirely in Chinese ('CLI 入口', '支持') with no indication that other languages are supported. This can conflict with language/locale policy when a skill presents a fixed language without user opt-in or documented justification.
The file-level description and user-visible/docstring text are written in Chinese, indicating an implicit language choice with no sign of user opt-in or locale selection. The policy requires avoiding forced language or locale constraints unless documented and justified or made optional.
The title and user-facing messages in this file are written in Chinese, and the generated completion message also assumes Chinese output. This can violate language/locale policy when the skill forces a specific language without user opt-in or documented justification.
Multiple user-facing messages, including errors and completion instructions, are presented only in Chinese. This creates a language-policy issue because the skill forces a specific language on users without opt-in or justification for a region-specific audience.
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
if ! python3 -m pip --version &> /dev/null; then
echo "❌ pip 未安装,尝试安装..."
python3 -m ensurepip --upgrade 2>/dev/null || {
echo "请手动安装 pip: curl https://bootstrap.pypa.io/get-pip.py | python3"
exit 1
}
fi
The natural-language description is presented only in Chinese, with no indication that users can choose another language or that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking context. This can violate language/locale policy when no opt-in or justification is provided.