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Security audit

CleanApp Report Submission

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill has a legitimate CleanApp report-submission purpose, but its helper code can execute unintended local commands and its configurable endpoint can send the API token and reports outside the documented CleanApp HTTPS endpoint.

Install only if you trust the publisher and can keep CLEANAPP_API_TOKEN scoped and revocable. Prefer the Python bulk ingester with --dry-run, --no-media, and --approx-location or --no-location, avoid the shell helper until fixed, and do not set CLEANAPP_BASE_URL to any non-CleanApp or non-HTTPS endpoint.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/submit_report.sh:132
Finding

Command Injection in the Single-Item Shell Helper

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
ingest.py:57
Finding

Bearer Token and Report Data Can Be Sent to an Arbitrary Endpoint

Content
View full analysis
Tuple[int, str]: data = json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8") req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, method="POST") req.add_header("content-type", "application/json") req.add_header("authorization", f"Bearer {token}") req.add_header("user-agent", "cleanapp-ingest-skill/1.0.1") with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout_sec) as resp: body = resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace") return int(resp.status), body ``` ```python ap.add_argument("--base-url", default=os.environ.get("CLEANAPP_BASE_URL", "https://live.cleanapp.io"), help="Base URL for CleanApp report-listener (default: https://live.cleanapp.io)") ``` ```python payload = {"items": items} url = args.base_url.rstrip("/") + "/v1/reports:bulkIngest" if args.dry_run: out = { "url": url, "ts": utc_now_iso(), "items": items, } print(json.dumps(out, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False)) return 0 status, body = post_json(url, token, payload, timeout_sec=args.timeout) ``` Shell implementation: ```bash BASE_URL="${CLEANAPP_BASE_URL:-https://live.cleanapp.io}" ``` ```bash --base-url) BASE_URL="$2"; shift 2 ;; ``` ```bash echo "Submitting 1 item to ${url} (source_id=${SOURCE_ID})" resp="$( curl -sS -w "\n%{http_code}" \ -X POST "${url}" \ -H "authorization: Bearer ${CLEANAPP_API_TOKEN}" \ -H "content-type: application/json" \ -d "${payload}" )" ``` ### Technical Analysis Both implementations accept a base URL from a command-line argument or envi ...[truncated 2234 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
str: parsed = urlsplit(value) if parsed.scheme != "https": raise SystemExit("base URL must use HTTPS") if parsed.hostname != "live.cleanapp.io": raise SystemExit("untrusted CleanApp API host") if parsed.username or parsed.password: raise SystemExit("credentials are not allowed in the base URL") if parsed.port not in (None, 443): raise SystemExit("unexpected API port") if parsed.query or parsed.fragment: raise SystemExit("query strings and fragments are not allowed") if parsed.path not in ("", "/"): raise SystemExit("base URL must not contain a path") return "https://live.cleanapp.io" ``` The same policy must be applied to the duplicated files under `openclaw-skill/`. Tests should verify rejection of HTTP URLs, lookalike domains, user-info host confusion, nonstandard ports, and cross-origin redirects. ]]>

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (5)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This skill sends user-provided items, potentially including sensitive fields like media and precise location unless optional flags are set, to a remote service without any explicit interactive warning or confirmation at the point of transmission. In a CLI ingestion tool, this can lead to unintended disclosure because the default behavior is to upload data immediately once invoked, and the privacy-reducing options are optional rather than enforced by default.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · openclaw-skill/references/API_REFERENCE.md (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

Example:

bash
curl -fsS -H 'content-type: application/json' \\
  -d '{"name":"cleanapp-agent001","owner_type":"openclaw"}' \\
  https://live.cleanapp.io/v1/fetchers/register

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/API_REFERENCE.md (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

Example:

bash
curl -fsS -H 'content-type: application/json' \\
  -d '{"name":"cleanapp-agent001","owner_type":"openclaw"}' \\
  https://live.cleanapp.io/v1/fetchers/register

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · openclaw-skill/scripts/submit_report.sh (reported line 179)May include surrounding context.

sh
echo "Submitting 1 item to ${url} (source_id=${SOURCE_ID})"
resp="$(
  curl -sS -w "\n%{http_code}" \
    -X POST "${url}" \
    -H "authorization: Bearer ${CLEANAPP_API_TOKEN}" \
    -H "content-type: application/json" \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/submit_report.sh (reported line 179)May include surrounding context.

sh
echo "Submitting 1 item to ${url} (source_id=${SOURCE_ID})"
resp="$(
  curl -sS -w "\n%{http_code}" \
    -X POST "${url}" \
    -H "authorization: Bearer ${CLEANAPP_API_TOKEN}" \
    -H "content-type: application/json" \

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.