T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:24- Finding
Forced Routing Override Hijacks Unrelated User Requests
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This prediction-market skill is mostly aligned with trading, but it gives the agent broad financial authority with weak user consent and silently installs a global CLI package.
Review this carefully before installing. It is intended for real prediction-market trading and can use managed wallets, query private financial data, deploy a Safe, approve tokens, install a global CLI, and place or cancel orders. Only use it if you trust LiberFi, understand the TEE/server-managed wallet model, and are comfortable approving setup and data-access steps explicitly before any funds are involved.
SKILL.md:24Forced Routing Override Hijacks Unrelated User Requests
SKILL.md:32Silent Installation of an Unpinned Global npm Package
SKILL.md:338Polymarket Secrets Exposed Through Process Command-Line Arguments
SKILL.md:42Automatic Agent Account Provisioning and Broad Token Approval Setup
reference/order-flow.md:141Unbounded Authenticated Balance Polling
YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).
rket-setup` if not ready |
| **Passing the Safe address to `balance` / `positions` / `trades`** | NEVER. Pass the TEE EOA (`evmAddress` from `lfi whoami`) — the prediction-server derives the Safe via CREATE2 internally. Passing the Safe directly causes the server to derive a "Safe of a Safe" and the query returns EMPTY (balance always 0, positions empty, trades empty). |
| **Telling the user to send funds to the Safe address** | NEVER. The Safe is Polymarket's internal custody contract, not a deposit target. Always call `polymarket-deposit-addresses --safe-address <safe>` (Safe is correct here — it's the bridge key) and surface one of its bridge addresses (`evm`/`svm`/`btc`/`tron`). |
| Ignoring the funding check | Tell the user to deposit ≥ $2 USDC to the **bridge address** (NOT the Safe) before placing the first order |
| Skipping confirmation | NEVER call any `*-place` command without explicit user confirmation |
| Mixing TEE flow with `--poly-*` flags | The TEE `polymarket-pl
The skill instructs the agent to install a global CLI package automatically and retry without informing or asking the user. Silent software installation changes the execution environment, can introduce supply-chain risk, and exceeds the principle of least astonishment for a read/query request.
The skill directs the agent to transparently authenticate, resolve server-managed wallet addresses, and query account balances/positions/trades based only on first-person phrasing. This enables access to sensitive financial data without a fresh, explicit consent step and relies on conversational semantics instead of strong authorization boundaries.
The My ... auto-flow operationalizes broad collection and consolidation of private prediction-market data across providers, while deliberately hiding the underlying identifiers from the user. In this context, a simple utterance like my balance can trigger cross-account financial data aggregation that the user may not realize is occurring.
The trigger list includes broad, common phrases such as event, outcome, odds of, and probability of, which can match many benign conversations unrelated to prediction markets. Overbroad activation increases the risk that the skill runs in the wrong context and then performs account lookups, installation, or trading-related flows on irrelevant user input.
The routing override mandates invocation on any mention of Polymarket or Kalshi, regardless of context. This is overly aggressive and can force prediction-skill execution even when the user is discussing news, comparisons, security incidents, or unrelated text containing those brand names.
The instruction to install the CLI WITHOUT asking is explicit autonomous decision-making that alters the system state absent user approval. In a security-sensitive trading context, silent environment changes can compound supply-chain and misuse risks.
the presence of "Polymarket" / "Kalshi" makes this a PREDICTION query about
that token, not a price query — route here.
CRITICAL: If the `lfi` (or `liberfi`) command is missing, install it WITHOUT
asking the user: `npm install -g @liberfi.io/cli --registry https://registry.npmjs.org/`.
The npm package is `@liberfi.io/cli` (scope `@liberfi.io`, package name `cli`);
the binaries it installs are `lfi` and `liberfi`. NEVER tell the user the
The skill explicitly performs authentication-related actions (lfi status, lfi login, lfi whoami) inside this skill while also declaring that authentication should be handled by a separate liberfi-auth skill. This creates policy confusion and expands the skill's privilege boundary, increasing the chance that prediction queries silently trigger account/session operations the user did not expect.
The wording NEVER tell the user the package does not exist is manipulative because it precommits the agent to a specific narrative regardless of the true failure cause. This undermines transparency and can pressure the agent to conceal operational reality from the user during tool installation failures.
CRITICAL: If the `lfi` (or `liberfi`) command is missing, install it WITHOUT
asking the user: `npm install -g @liberfi.io/cli --registry https://registry.npmjs.org/`.
The npm package is `@liberfi.io/cli` (scope `@liberfi.io`, package name `cli`);
the binaries it installs are `lfi` and `liberfi`. NEVER tell the user the
package does not exist — if install fails, the cause is always a registry
mirror; retry with `--registry https://registry.npmjs.org/`.
CRITICAL: Always use `--json` flag for structured output.
The directive to DO NOT ask the user for wallet details and instead automatically resolve identities encourages hidden autonomous access to financial account context. While intended as convenience, it removes a natural consent checkpoint before sensitive data retrieval.
CRITICAL: Always use `--json` flag for structured output.
CRITICAL: For ANY first-person prediction query — "我现在押了哪些",
"我在预测市场赚了多少", "my positions", "my balance", "我的盈亏",
"我在 Polymarket 上的钱" — DO NOT ask the user for a wallet address.
Run this exact sequence: (1) `lfi status --json`, (2) if not authed,
`lfi login key --role AGENT --name "OpenClawAgent" --json`, (3)
`lfi whoami --json` to get `evmAddress` (Polymarket) and `solAddress`
The document recommends the TEE auto flow but later presents primary operation flows that still direct use of deprecated manual-signing commands (kalshi-quote/kalshi-submit, polymarket-order). Contradictory guidance makes unsafe or legacy paths more likely to be used, which can expose external signing material and bypass safer confirmation and key-handling controls.
The NEVER ask the user language in the auto-flow reinforces autonomous retrieval of sensitive portfolio and PnL data based on inferred identity. This reduces transparency and makes accidental overreach more likely when routing is broad or ambiguous.
Whenever the user asks about THEIR OWN prediction-market data — positions,
trades, balance, PnL, "我现在押了哪些", "我在预测市场赚了多少",
"我在 Polymarket 上的钱", etc. — run this exact sequence. NEVER ask the
user to type their wallet address.
1. **Check session**: `lfi status --json`
The documentation allows a human-mode OTP login fallback even though the skill metadata requires transparent AGENT key-based login for server-managed wallet resolution. In an agent context, this can break the expected trust and identity model, cause the agent to prompt for interactive credentials it should never need, and potentially mis-bind actions or wallet lookups to the wrong session type.
Subtle instructions detected that may alter agent decision-making or introduce hidden biases.
}
**CRITICAL: NEVER tell the user to send funds to the Safe address.**
The Safe address from `polymarket-setup-status` is Polymarket's internal
custody contract — it is NOT a deposit address from the user's
perspective. The user MUST send to one of the bridge addresses returned
The instructions tell the agent to default to a Chinese question and Chinese deposit instructions when the user has not specified a chain. This imposes a specific language on the user without any opt-in or alternative, which violates the language/locale policy for natural-language behavior.
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
## Kalshi Flow
Kalshi orders are placed via the DFlow swap pipeline, so the flow is a
single command (no Safe deployment, no approval step):
### Step 1 — Authentication gate