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Security audit

video-script-to-post

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a prompt-only Chinese short-video planning skill with no evidence of hidden execution, data access, persistence, or automatic posting.

Installers should understand this skill is aimed at Chinese short-video platform workflows and produces planning guidance rather than verified legal, copyright, or platform-policy clearance. Review any generated marketing and compliance claims before publishing.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (5)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This file contains user-facing natural-language content exclusively in Chinese, including the description, parameter descriptions, workflow, and output template. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy violation unless the locale constraint is explicitly justified, which is not present here.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The schema and metadata are entirely Chinese-oriented and do not provide a language-selection parameter or justify a locale restriction. This can cause the agent to override user language expectations, misunderstand prompts, or generate content in an unintended language, which becomes more risky in a multi-platform publishing workflow where incorrect language output may lead to user confusion, reputational harm, or accidental posting errors.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding

This markdown file contains substantive user-facing content in Chinese, but it does not state that the skill is intended for Chinese-speaking users or offer any language/locale choice. Under the policy rule for natural-language violations, forcing a specific language without opt-in can be a policy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The natural-language documentation forces a specific language for all users of the skill. Under the policy, language constraints should either be optional for the user or explicitly justified as region-specific.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill description is very broad and promises an end-to-end content pipeline without defining clear boundaries, exclusions, or triggering conditions. In an agent setting, overbroad scope can cause the skill to activate for loosely related requests and produce actions or guidance beyond the user's intended context, increasing the chance of misuse or unsafe automation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.